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General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By David Frisch* and John D. Wladis** 
EFFECT OF OTHER STATUTES UPON U.C.C. 
This year several cases discussed the preemptive effect of the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act1 upon state law tort and contract claims 
arising from the sale of cigarettes to smokers who contracted cancer. This is 
aptly illustrated by Forster v. R. ]. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 which was decided 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In that case, the smoker (Forster) sued a 
cigarette manufacturer (R.J. Reynolds) in strict products liability,3 misrepre-
sentation, breach of warranty, and negligence.4 The cigarette manufacturer 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act preempted all state tort claims. The trial court agreed 
and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding no preemption of state tort claims.6 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court granted the cigarette manufacturer's petition for review and, in an en 
bane decision, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The supreme court ruled 
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted only those 
state claims based on failure to warn theories.6 It ruled that the strict products 
liability, breach of warranty, and negligence counts were not preempted to the 
*Mr. Frisch is a member of the Florida and Rhode Island bars and a professor of law at the 
Widener University School of Law (formerly known as Delaware Law School of Widener 
University). 
**Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and an associate professor of law at the Widener 
University School of Law. 
I. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1331-41 (1988). 
2. 437 N.W.2d 655, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 370 (Minn. 1989). 
3. Apparently this was a strict liability in tort claim. See 437 N.W.2d at 661, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 374. 
4. The smoker's wife was also a plaintiff. She alleged loss of consortium. Both plaintiffs also 
sought punitive damages. 
5. 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
6. The preemption was held not to be retroactive. Thus claims arising before the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was enacted could be asserted even on failure to warn 
theories. 437 N.W.2d at 66. This holding is consistent with other cases. See, e.g., Kotler v. American 
Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 18, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1074, 1078 (D. Mass. 
1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D.N.j. 1986) (holding based on 
agreement of the parties). 
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extent that they were not based on such theories. In effect this left the smoker 
free to pursue claims based on defects in cigarettes;7 but, the court did not 
resolve the question of whether cigarettes can be defective because they are 
addictive and harmful to health.8 The court also held that a claim of misrepre-
sentation arising from alleged false st:ttements made in cigarette advertising was 
not preempted. 9 
THE INTERACTION OF TORT AND CONTRACT 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
The economic loss doctrine continues to make headway. This doctrine bars 
suit in negligence or strict liability in tort by commercial buyers of defective 
products who suffer purely economic loss. 
Two cases applied the economic loss doctrine to suits on contracts for 
professional services. In Employer's Insurance v. Suwannee River Spa Lines, 
Inc., 10 the United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit applied the eco-
nomic loss doctrine to admiralty claims arising out of contracts for the construc-
tion of ocean-going tugbarges. One of the barges sunk and the others could not 
be used until the cause of the sinking had been ascertained and preventative 
repairs had been made. The owner of the barges (Occidental), seeking compen-
sation for the sinking, for repairs to the remaining barges, and for loss of use, 
sued a host of defendants responsible for the construction of the barges. Included 
among the defendants were the builder (Avondale) and the construction super-
visors (Hvide). The owner claimed breach of contract or warranty and negligent 
performance of contract against each of these defendants. The negligence claims 
appear to have been pleaded to avoid the limitation of liability clause in each 
contract. The district court found both the builder and the supervisor to be 
liable for breach of contract and for negligent performance. u On appeal, both 
builder and supervisor alleged that they could not be held liable in negligence. 
The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed. It held that the economic loss doctrine 
7. Accord Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callag-
han) 1074 (D. Mass. 1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 578 nn. 46, 51, 52 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
8. 437 N.W.2d at 661 n.8. The resolution of this question depends, in large measure, on 
whether or not a court adopts the position set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
Comment i, (1965) (products like tobacco and whiskey even though addictive and harmful to health 
are not defective unless foreign substances added). 
9. But see Cipollone, 893 F.2d 541 (intentional torts arising from advertising or promotion of 
cigarettes are preempted). 
10. 866 F.2d 752, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659 (5th Cir. 1989). 
11. The district court found the builder's liability limitation clause to have effectively disclaimed 
tort liability; the court found the supervisor's liability limitation clause did not cover tort liability. 
Id. at 757, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 664. The other defendants were dismissed from 
the suit. 
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applied to contracts for professional services and barred liability in negligence 
for the economic loss the plaintiff alleged in this case. 12 
In Werner & Pfleider Corp. v. Gary Chemical Corp.,13 the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, applying New Jersey law, also 
held the economic loss doctrine applicable to a contract for services. 14 In that 
case, the buyer (Gary Chemical) purchased a plastics processing machine from 
a distributor (WPC). When the machine failed to perform as expected, the 
buyer withheld a part of the purchase price. Upon suit by the distributor for the 
price, the buyer counterclaimed for economic loss based on, inter alia, negligent 
supervision, negligent design, and fraud. 15 These claims were made to avoid a 
limitation of liability clause contained in the contract. The court held that under 
New Jersey law16 both the negligence and fraud claims were barred. Conse-
quently, it granted summary judgment against the buyer on those claims. 
In several cases, buyers of goods sued their sellers in tort for economic loss. 
Apparently each did so to avoid contractual remedy limitations or limited 
warranty clauses in their contracts. In each case the courts barred the tort 
claims. In Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, lnc.,17 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the commercial buyer of a backhoe cannot 
sue the remote manufacturer in negligence or strict liability in tort for purely 
economic loss where the buyer has accepted repairs under a manufacturer's 
warranty which specifically limited liability to the furnishing of replacement 
parts. 
12. The Fifth Circuit also upheld the builder's liability limitation clause. Id. at 776-80, 8 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 675-80. 
13. 697 F. Supp. 808, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1064 (D.N.J. 1988). 
14. Courts are split on whether the economic loss doctrine can apply to contracts for services. In 
favor of such aµplication are the following cases: Employers Ins. v. Suwannee River Spa Lines, Inc., 
866 F.2d 752, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying federal admiralty 
law); cf East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986) (same); Flinkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(applying Georgia law). Cases against such application include: Consol. Edison Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1496 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(applying New York law); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 664 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1988). Cases reserving judgment include: 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Penn. Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 183 n.13, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1319, 1327-28 n.13 (7th Cir. 1986) (question not reached because contract found to be 
predominantly for sale of goods); Adams Laboratories Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g Co., 761 F.2d 1218, 
1223-24 (7th Cir. 1985) (question not reached but court described Illinois law on point as "far from 
clear"). 
15. The buyer also counterclaimed for breach of the distributor's warranty and instituted a third 
party action against the manufacturer of the machine as a third party beneficiary of the express 
warranty given by the manufacturer to the distributor. The court held that these claims survived 
summary judgment to the extent that they sought damages permissible under the limitation of 
liability clauses contained in each warranty. 
16. Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1184 ( 1985 ). 
17. 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 652 (1989). 
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In Rust-Pru/ Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 18 the Michigan Court of Appeals 
rejected a similar claim. In that case, a rust-proofing company, asserting the 
rights of customers' vehicles it had rust-proofed, sued the manufacturer of the 
vehicles in tort. The rust-proofing company claimed defective design or manu-
facture of the vehicles, which it alleged had prevented it from adequately 
treating the vehicles. The suit was in tort because the manufacturer's sale 
warranty had expired before the problem surfaced. Based on Michigan law, 19 
the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment against the rust-proofer. 20 
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
In Childs v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,21 a Virginia circuit court deter-
mined that its legislature's enactment of U.C.C. section 2-318 precluded the 
judicial adoption of strict liability in tort. However, the weight of authority is 
decidedly against this view. 22 Though the few courts adopting this view speak of 
legislative preclusion or preemption, they do not provide any direct evidence 
that either the drafters of the article 2 warranty provisions23 or the particular 
state legislature intended such effect. The real issues here are not whether 
enactment of the U.C.C. in any particular jurisdiction has preempted strict 
liability in tort, for usually there is no indication that the legislature even 
considered the question. The real issues are whether contract-based defenses, 
such as warranty disclaimer, should bar suits for personal injury by remote 
purchasers and, if not, whether the more appropriate institution to adopt strict 
liability in tort is the judiciary or the legislature. Unfortunately, these issues are 
not likely to disappear and may even become more pressing now that states have 
begun to enact the new article 2A. That article codifies personal property 
leasing and includes warranty sections analogous to those in article 2. 24 
Misuse of the goods is a defense to both tort and warranty claims against the 
manufacturer or seller. The effect of the defense can vary between tort and 
contract, and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Sometimes, the defense com-
pletely bars any recovery, as under a contributory negligence or assumption of 
18. 172 Mich. App. 58, 431 N.W.2d 245, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1058 (1988). 
19. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty's Inc., 154 Mich. App. 634, 397 N.W.2d 853, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1526, appeal denied, 428 Mich. 874 (1987). 
20. See also Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 690 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (apparently applying Pennsylvania law) (former purchaser of 
herbicide cannot sue remote manufacturer in tort for crop loss allegedly caused by failure of 
herbicide). 
21. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1080 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988). 
22. See Annotation, Pre-emption of Strict Liability in Tort by Provisions of U.C.C. article 2, 15 
A.L.R. 4th 791 (1982 & 1989 Supp.). 
23. For evidence that the drafters of article 2 did not intend preemption, see Wade, Is Section 
402 A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the U.C.C. and Therefore Unconstitu-
tional?, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974). 
24. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-210 to 216. The drafters of article 2A intended not to "change the 
development of the relationship or' strict liability in tort to the provisions of the U.C.C.; id. § 2A-
216, Official Comment. 
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risk system; sometimes it only reduces the amount of recovery, as under a 
comparative fault system.25 Coter v. Barber-Green Co.,26 decided by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, illustrates this point. In that case, a worker 
was severely injured while using a machine which he knew to be defective. The 
worker sued the manufacturer (Barber-Greene) and the seller of the machine 
(New England). The jury concluded that both defendants were liable in 
negligence. Since Massachusetts had adopted a comparative fault system for 
negligence, the jury apportioned the negligence. In so doing it found the 
worker's conduct in using a machine he knew to be defective to be contributory 
negligence and reduced the recovery accordingly. On the warranty claim, the 
jury found that recovery was completely barred by the worker's conduct. After 
several post-trial motions, the trial judge gave judgment for the worker. On 
appeal, the seller and the manufacturer contended that the jury's decision on the 
warranty count required a similar finding on the negligence count. The court 
rejected this argument, reasoning that each count was based upon a separate 
theory of liability. In warranty, plaintiff's misuse of a product could bar its 
recovery. In negligence, however, misuse did not necessarily bar recovery 
because Massachusetts had enacted a comparative negligence statute. The court 
concluded its decision by indicating that a comparative fault system perhaps 
should be adopted in warranty but left that decision to the legislature. 
Several recent cases have permitted plaintiffs to assert traditional tort de-
fenses or theories of recovery in breach of warranty actions. In Castrignano v. 
E.R. Squibb &- Sons, lnc., 21 the Rhode Island Supreme Court permitted a drug 
manufacturer to raise the "unavoidably unsafe" defense28 in a personal injury 
warranty action. In that case, plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal 
injuries she allegedly suffered in utero when her mother took DES, a synthetic 
hormone, prescribed for plaintiff's mother to prevent the mother from spontane-
ously miscarrying the plaintiff. She sued the drug manufacturer in federal court 
on several theories, of which the trial judge submitted four to the jury; negli-
gence, strict liability in tort, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and 
breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. The jury found for 
the plaintiff on the strict liability and warranty of merchantability counts. The 
drug manufacturer moved for a new trial, contending that the jury charge had 
not included the "unavoidably unsafe" defense. Before ruling on the motion, the 
25. See generally B. Clark & C. Smith, The Law of Product Warranties 'II 12.03[8] (1984 and 
1988 Cum. Supp.) 
26. 403 Mass. 50, 525 N.E.2d 1305, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 375 (1988). 
27. 546 A.2d 775, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1423 (R.I. 1988). 
28. The "unavoidably unsafe" defense is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
Comment k (1965). Basically, the defense applies to products such as drugs or vaccines which are 
incapable of being made completely safe for their intended and ordinary use but which nevertheless 
serve very beneficial functions. For example, the vaccine used in the Pasteur treatment for rabies can 
itself cause serious injury. However, since the disease if left untreated leads to a horrible death, the 
unavoidably high risk involved in administering the vaccine is justified, if the product is properly 
prepared and accompanied by adequate warnings and instructions. Thus Comment k states that the 
seller of such vaccine is not liable under § 402A. 
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federal trial judge certified several questions to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court. In response to those questions, the supreme court held: (i) the plaintiff 
could maintain her strict liability and warranty of merchantability claims on 
these facts; (ii) the "unavoidably unsafe" defense was available against both 
claims; and (iii) the application of the defense was a mixed question of law and 
fact on which the defendant bore the burden of proof. 
In Yates v. Norton Co.,29 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court permit-
ted a plaintiff to assert an implied warranty of merchantability claim on a 
failure to warn theory. In that case, a worker suffered fatal injury by inhaling 
noxious fumes while wearing a respirator. The administratrix of the worker's 
estate sued the manufacturer of the respirator for breach of warranty and 
negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer on both counts. On 
appeal, the supreme judicial court reversed and remanded for a new trial on 
both counts. As to the warranty count, the court found the jury charge to have 
been deficient because it did not clearly tell the jury that failure to give adequate 
warnings constituted a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 
ARTICLE TWO-SALES OF GOODS 
CONTRACT FORMATION AND TERMS 
Statute of Frauds 
In view of the questionable need for a modern day statute of frauds,30 it is not 
surprising to encounter philosophical differences of opinion, often among mem-
bers of the same court. Consider the majority and dissenting opinions of the 
New York Court of Appeals in Bazak International Corp. v. Mast lndustries,31 
involving the merchant's exception to the statute of frauds under U.C.C. section 
2-201 (2).32 The confirmatory documents were, according to the buyer (Bazak), 
five printed purchase-order forms bearing the date of the alleged oral contract. 
Each contained the handwritten words, "As prisented [sic] by Karen Fedorko," 
(a reference to the seller's agent who had dealt with buyer) and in small print, 
29. 403 Mass. 70, 525 N.E.2d 1317, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1441 (1988). 
30. The future of U.C.C. § 2-201 is one of the many areas being considered by the study 
committee formed by the Permanent Editorial Board to review article 2 and to consider whether it 
should be revised. This subject was also one of the topics of discussion at the meeting of the 
Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Sales, and Documents of Title in Houston, Texas 
(Spring, 1989). Of those present, some thought the statute should be retained in its present form; 
some were of the opinion it should be retained, but revised; and some favored scrapping it 
altogether. 
31. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1380 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989). 
32. Other such cases decided during this survey period include Hilord Chemical Corp. v. Ricoh 
Electronics, Inc., 875 F.2d 32, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 904 (2d Cir. 1989); Polygram, 
S.A. v. 32-03 Enter. Inc., 697 F. Supp. 132, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 914 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988); Adams v. Petrade Int'l Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 369 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1988). See also Comment, The Merchant's Exception to the Uniform Commercial Code's 
Statute of Frauds, 32 Viii. L. Rev. 133 (1987). 
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the following: "This is only an offer and not a contract unless accepted in 
writing by the seller, and subject to prior sale."33 
The first task for the court of appeals was to formulate the applicable 
standard for determining whether a document qualifies as a confirmation.34 It 
rejected the conclusion reached by several courts that explicit words of confirma-
tion or an express reference to the prior agreement is necessary.35 Rather, the 
court was of the opinion that the degree of explicitness required under subsec-
tions ( 1) and (2) of U.C.C. section 2-201 should be the same. That is, a 
document is a confirmation under subsection (2) if it is "sufficient against the 
sender" under subsection ( 1 ). Such would be the case if, assuming the other 
requirements are met, the document is "sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made."36 According to the court, this standard was met. 37 The date 
and specificity of the orders, along with the mention of a presentation by Karen 
Fedorko, suggested that a previous agreement had been reached. The "offer" 
language on the forms was thought to be irrelevant since it appeared that much 
of the content of each form, including this language, was intended to be effective 
only when buyer was acting in the capacity of a seller. 
The dissent saw things quite differently. The point made was that, notwith-
standing the standard adopted by the court, the orders were at best ambiguous. 
According to Justice Alexander, they did not lead one to conclude that an 
existing contract was more probable than not. 38 
The court's decision that a document's sufficiency under U.C.C. section 2-
201 (2) should depend on its sufficiency under subsection (1) seems correct. The 
purpose of the merchant's exception was to take from the recipient of the 
confirmation the opportunity to speculate at the sender's expense. If the sender 
has lost the statute's protection, the recipient should also, unless the existence of 
a contract is timely disavowed. To require more from a confirmation than 
satisfaction of subsection ( 1) is to expose the sender to the risk of the same 
inequitable conduct that the drafters in subsection (2) sought to eliminate. 
However, the court's conclusion that the purchase orders met the test of 
subsection (1) was questionable. Because of the inherent indeterminacy of that 
test, much will depend upon the decisionmaker's attitude toward the statute. In 
33. Furthermore, each purchase order was transmitted to seller through facilities located at the 
office of its own parent company in New York. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1384. 
34. The court excluded from consideration parol evidence on the theory that to permit evidence 
extrinsic to the documents would frustrate the purposes of the statute. Id. at 1383. 
35. See Trilco Terminal v. Prebuilt Corp., 167 N.J. Super. 449, 400 A.2d 1237, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 616, ajfd without opinion, 174 N.J. Super. 24, 415 A.2d 356 (1980); 
Normanjil Sportswear Corp. v. TG& Y Stores Co., 644 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
36. u.c.c. § 2-201 ( 1 ). 
37. At the outset, the court was careful to remind the reader that its disposition of the statute of 
frauds issue was in no way intended to resolve the underlying dispute. The plaintiff must still prove 
that a contract existed. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1383. 
38. This, it was argued, is a finding that even the most liberal construction of U.C.C. § 2-201(1) 
requires. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1392. Justice Alexander believed that, at best, the 
documents allowed "for equally probable inferences that the parties either engaged only in 
negotiations or entered a contract." Id. at 1394. 
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any event, the lesson of the case is clear: to guarantee the protection of the 
statute, the only safe course is to respond to all communications addressing the 
sale or purchase of goods. 
A difference in attitude also divided the Second Circuit in Trebor Sportwear 
Co. v. The Limited Stores, /nc. 39 The issue was whether a cover letter and draft 
agreement, prepared as part of an effort to settle an ongoing dispute between the 
parties, were properly admissible to satisfy the statute of frauds. The trial court 
refused to consider either document on the grounds that they constituted an offer 
of settlement, and thus were inadmissible under rule 408 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that exclusion of this evidence 
was not an abuse of discretion. Although the proffer was for a purpose other 
than to prove or disprove the validity of the underlying claim, the court was of 
the opinion that the policy of rule 408 militated against consideration of this 
material. 40 
While it is certainly true, as the majority suggests, that satisfying the statute 
is the first step toward ultimate victory, it is doubtful whether admission of 
documents for this purpose will impact in any significant way on settlement 
negotiations. Although a statute of frauds defense matters when litigation 
ensues, it seems reasonable to assume that preservation of that defense is not a 
major pre-litigation concern. 
In DF Activities Corp. v. Brown,41 the Seventh Circuit was faced with the 
"judicial admission" exception to the statute. 42 The members of this court, too, 
could not agree on the result. The facts were simple. Plaintiff alleged an oral 
contract to buy a chair designed by Frank Lloyd Wright. Defendant moved to 
dismiss and filed in support, thereof, an affidavit that she never agreed to sell the 
chair to plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant despite 
plaintiff's contention that it should be given the opportunity to depose defendant 
in order to elicit an involuntary admission. 
The Seventh Circuit, on appeal, affirmed. Rejecting a statement by J. White 
and R. Summers that a statute of frauds' defense must always be determined at 
trial because the defendant might, in cross-examination, admit the making of 
the contract,43 the court distinguished the case before it from one where there is 
only an unsupported assertion that no contract had been made. Where, as in 
39. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 975 (2d Cir. 1989). 
40. Conceding that evidence offered for "another purpose" is not necessarily barred by rule 408, 
the court was quick to adopt the cautionary warning that "care should be taken that an indiscrimi-
nate and mechanistic application of this 'exception' to rule 408 does not result in undermining the 
rule's public policy objective." Id. at 982 (citing 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 
408[05], 408-31 (1988)). Since overcoming the statute of frauds is the first step toward establishing 
liability, the court felt constrained to decide the case the way it did. The dissent, on the other hand, 
saw the nexus between being able to satisfy the statute and being able to prove the existence of an 
oral contract as too attenuated to implicate the policy considerations underlying rule 408 if evidence 
is offered solely to accomplish the former. Id. at 983 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). 
41. 851 F.2d 920, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1396 (7th Cir. 1988). 
42. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b). 
43. 851 F.2d at 922-23, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1398. 
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this case, the denial is under oath, the remote possibility of a subsequent 
admission does not justify further litigation. 44 The dissent thought otherwise. In 
the opinion of Judge Flaum, the decision whether to allow further discovery 
should lie within the trial court's discretion. In this case, Judge Flaum believed 
the district court abused that discretion. 45 
Perhaps a compromise position is possible. Why not allow discovery limited 
to the statute of frauds' issue? If no admission is obtained, the case could then be 
dismissed. 
Parol Evidence Rule 
Everybody knows that section 2-202 (the U.C.C. version of the parol evidence 
rule) has discarded the requirement that a final 46 writing's terms be ambiguous 
before extrinsic evidence can be introduced to explain the meaning of the terms. 
Well not quite. The Official Comment to that section throws out the ambiguity 
prerequisite only for "the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a)"; that is, 
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance.47 Each of these 
terms is defined in the Code. 48 As for extrinsic evidence, such as statements, or 
other conduct of parties during their negotiations which do not fit into one of 
these three categories, courts still require that the writing be ambiguous before 
such evidence is admissible. 49 
This point is illustrated in Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, Inc. v. Mills-Win.field 
Engineering Sales, Inc., 50 decided by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. In that 
case, the plaintiff leased a cement unloading machine. The contract contained 
44. The diverse views on this subject are discussed in Triangle Mktg., Inc. v. Action Indus., Inc., 
630 F. Supp. 1578, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 36 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
45. Missing from defendant's affidavit was a blanket denial that an agreement had been reached. 
Defendant stated only that she did not accept plaintiff's offer to purchase the chair and did not recall 
having a particular conversation with plaintiff's representative. 
46. "Final" here means that the writing is integrated. In Code terms it is "intended by the 
parties as a final expression of their agreement." U.C.C. § 2-202. 
47. Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-202 Official Comment l(c). 
48. For definitions of "course of dealing" and "usage of trade" see U.C.C. § 1-205; for "course 
of performance" see U.C.C. § 2-208. 
49. See, e.g., Shephard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 760 (Wyo. 1977); Central Jersey Dodge Truck Center, Inc. v. Sightseer Corp., 608 
F.2d 1106, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1256 (6th Cir. 1979); Durbano Metals Inc. v. A&K 
R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 299 (Utah 1978); Rainer 
Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 287 (1981); Paragon Resources Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 723 F.2d 419, 37 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1482 (5th Cir. 1984); Harper v. Calvert, 687 S.W.2d 227, 39 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, 
Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 59 (W.D. Va. 1986) rev'd, 884 F.2d 
1388 (4th Cir. 1989); Ci bro Petroleum Prods, v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 602 F. Supp. 1520, 
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1220 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). 
50. 436 N.W.2d 121, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). For a 
similar ruling, see Warnaco Inc. v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 427 
(2d Cir. 1989) (evidence of proposal made during negotiations inadmissible to explain language of 
written guarantee where language was unambiguous). 
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an express warranty of merchantability, effectively disclaiming all other war-
ranties, and included a merger clause stating that the written lease contained the 
entire contract of the parties. The lessee sued for breach of warranty, claiming 
that the machine failed to meet an unloading rate stated by the lessor but not 
included in the lease. The trial court found the machine's description in the 
lease, "Docksider 11-V," to be ambiguous, and so admitted extrinsic evidence of 
the seller's unloading rate statement. It then found for the buyer. On appeal, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that the description was not 
ambiguous and that the lease was not so incomplete on warranties as to permit 
evidence of the extrinsic statement.51 
Buyers who fail to read invoices packaged with goods sent to them may be 
bound by the terms of the invoice. A court could hold the invoice to be a final 
expression of the terms contained in the invoice with the consequence that the 
buyer cannot introduce extrinsic evidence, written or oral, to contradict or 
explain its terms. 52 This is precisely what happened to the buyer in Polygram, 
S.A. v. 32-03 Enterprises, Inc., decided by the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York. 53 In that case, the buyer had been a 
distributor of seller's phonograph records, tapes, and compact discs for some 
time. It received several shipments of these goods, each of which was accompa-
nied by an invoice. Each invoice contained a clause requiring any claim 
concerning the goods (including claims of defects) to be made within three 
calendar months after delivery. The buyer did not object to any of the terms in 
the invoices and eventually issued checks to pay for each shipment. When these 
checks were dishonored, the seller sued for the contract price of each shipment. 
The buyer defended asserting the statute of frauds and defects in the goods. The 
seller moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The court 
disposed of the statute of frauds defense on the grounds that the buyer's failure 
to give written notice of objection to the invoices foreclosed it from asserting that 
51. The court applied common law and cited § 2-202 in passing, apparently because this was a 
lease rather than a sale. Minnesota has since enacted article 2A which governs leases of goods. 
Minn. Stat. Ann.§§ 336.2A-101-531(West1990). However this would not change the result here, 
because the article 2A parol evidence rule(§ 2A-202) is identical to the article 2 parol evidence rule. 
52. Compare the effect of an invoice under subsection 2-201(2) (see 2 R. Anderson, Anderson on 
the U.C.C. §§ 2-201:133-134 (3d ed. (1982)) and under§ 2-207; e.g., Interlake, Inc. v. Kansas 
Power & Light Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 16, 637 P.2d 464, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 171 
( 1981) rev'd, 231 Kan. 251, 644 P.2d 385 (1982); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 
758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1076 (10th Cir. 1983); Therma-Coustics Mfg., Inc. v. 
Borden, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 282, 213 Cal. Rep. 611, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1640 
(1985); Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 104 Idaho 284, 658 P.2d 955, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 52, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1129 (1983); Offen, Inc. v. Rocky Mt. 
Constructors Inc., 765 P.2d 600, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 47 (Cqlo. Ct. App. 1988). But 
see Trust Co. Bank v. Barrett Distrib., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 959, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
986 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (contract formed when seller shipped goods); In re Isis Foods, Inc., 38 Bankr. 
48, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1134 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (same). 
53. 697 F. Supp. 132; 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions 2299 
defense under section 2-201.s• The court disposed of the defects in the goods 
defense on the grounds that the buyer had not timely notified the seller of 
breach. The court also declined to consider a letter sent by seller to buyer prior 
to the shipments in question, which the buyer characterized as permitting an 
open-ended return policy. It did so on the grounds that the invoice was, under 
section 2-202, a final expression of the parties' agreement on the return policy 
which could not be contradicted by the letter.ss In the court's view, the buyer 
assented to the terms of the invoice by accepting the goods which accompanied 
the invoice.s6 This case is consistent with others that have held invoices to be 
final expressions for purposes of section 2-202.s7 
Battle of the Forms 
Often in battle of the forms cases, one side will sign the other side's form. 
Usually the signing party is held to be bound to the terms of the form he signed 
regardless of whether he read the form. 58 In one case decided this year, Weyher/ 
Livsey Constructors, Inc. v. International Chemical Co.,s9 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit indicated that this is not always so. In 
that case, the buyer (Weyher) purchased coal for use in testing boilers it was 
manufacturing for the army. It sent a purchase order for the coal to the seller, 
who signed it without objection. The purchase order set forth coal size specifica-
tions. On the back of the form was a clause in which the seller was said to 
warrant the goods sold for one year. The clauses on the back were very difficult 
to read and, in the words of trial court, "border on being illegible."60 Several 
months after the last delivery of coal, the buyer notified the seller that the coal 
did not conform to the size specifications. The buyer resold the coal, covered, 
and sued for damages. After the buyer had finished presenting its evidence at 
trial, the trial court granted the seller's motion for an involuntary dismissal. It 
held that the warranty clause was unenforceable, because it was not conspicuous 
under the U.C.C. The basis for the dismissal apparently was a failure of the 
54. The court applied subsection 2-201(2) (written confirmation under some circumstance can 
disable recipient from asserting statute of frauds if he does not object to it in writing within 10 days 
of receipt). 
55. In passing, the court noted that, even if the letter had been considered, the result would be no 
different, since the letter did not support the buyer's characterization of it. 
56. The court also held that the invoice term on giving notice of returns was not unconscionable 
and that the time period allowed by that term for giving notice was not manifestly unreasonable 
under U.C.C. § 1-204. 
57. See, e.g., Battista v. Radesi, 112 A.D.2d 42, 491 N.Y.S.2d 81, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 748 (App. Div. 1985); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Fairway Dodge Sales, 
Inc., 80 A.D.2d 740, 437 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 1981); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Jaiswal, 93 
A.D.2d 969, 463 N.Y.S.2d 78, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414 (App. Div. 1983); Morrison 
v. Devore Trucking, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 2d 140, 428 N.E.2d 438, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
779 ( 1980); Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., 679 S.W.2d 779, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 773 (Tex. App: 1984), ajfd in part, 690 S.W.2d 570 (1985). 
58. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 410 (3d ed. 1987). 
59. 864 F.2d 130, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 646 (11th Cir. 1989). 
60. Id. at 132, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 648. 
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buyer to give timely notice of breach, and the buyer seems to have argued that 
the warranty clause gave it at least one year to notify of breach. On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that the trial court applied the 
wrong standard in determining whether the warranty clause was part of the 
contract. The U.C.C. requires that only certain clauses, such as warranty 
disclaimers, be conspicuous; there is no U.C.C. requirement for express war-
ranties. The court stated that the trial court should apply general contract 
principles to determine whether the warranty was enforceable. Under general 
contract principles, courts traditionally do not enforce clauses against signers if 
the clauses are not legible or if they have not sufficiently been called to the 
attention of the signer.61 Thus on remand, the seller may well be held not to be 
bound to the warranty clause even though he signed the form containing the 
clause. 
Warranties 
Warranty Of Title 
Does the warranty of title run to remote purchasers or only to immediate 
purchasers? The courts are split.62 The text and Official Comments to U.C.C. 
section 2-312 are silent on the question; nor do the drafters seem to have had the 
warranty of title in mind when they devised U.C.C. section 2-318 which 
permits certain classes of persons to sue as third party beneficiaries of express or 
implied warranties.63 
According to Williston, under pre-Code law the warranty of title ran only to 
the immediate buyer. 64 Even if the immediate buyer assigned its rights under the 
warranty to the next purchaser, that purchaser could recover only for the injury 
to the immediate buyer and not for its own injury, since it was asserting the 
rights of the immediate buyer, not its own rights.65 Yet even though the 
warranty did not run to the remote purchaser, the seller could not escape 
liability for injury to that purchaser. The remote purchaser could recover from 
its seller, the immediate buyer, who in turn could recover from its seller 
compensation for direct injury to it and also for damages which the immediate 
buyer had to pay to the remote purchaser. Thus, the original seller ultimately 
would be liable for the injury caused to each successive purchaser. This result 
61. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 58, at 411-14. 
62. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales Bulk, Transfers, and Documents of Title, 44 
Bus. Law. 1445, 1455 n.46 (1989). See also Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 703 F. Supp. 511, 8 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 363 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that warranty of title runs only 
to immediate purchaser). 
63. The drafting history of U.C.C. § 2-318 indicates that the drafters were concerned with the 
warranties of quality, not the title warranty. See, e.g., A.L.l., Uniform Revised Sales Act, Comment 
on Section 43 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 Apr. 27, 1944); reprinted in 2 Uniform Commercial 
Code: Drafts 163-67 ( 1984 ). 
64. 1 S. Williston, The Law Governing Sales of Goods at Common Law and Under the 
Uniform Sales Act § 244, at 645, 648 (I 948). 
65. Id. at 647. 
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required a multiplicity of actions. This cumbersome procedure, together with 
the demise of the privity requirement for warranties of quality, may well 
account for those cases which hold that the warranty of title under U.C.C. 
section 2-312 runs to the remote purchaser. 
In Brokke v. Williams,66 the Montana Supreme Court held that the warranty 
of title is not disclaimed where the goods were sold "as is." In that case, the 
buyer purchased a camera from a pawnbroker, who had posted large fluorescent 
signs on his premises stating that he sold merchandise "as is. " 67 He wrote 
similar legends on his sales slips. Later, it was determined that the camera had 
been stolen and the buyer surrendered it to the police. The buyer then sued the 
seller for breach of the warranty of title. The court gave judgment for the buyer. 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the posting of 
"as is" signs was not sufficient to disclaim the warranty of title under U.C.C. 
subsection 2-312(2). It also emphasized that the warranty of title could not be 
disclaimed under U.C.C. section 2-316 (which permits "as is" disclaimers to be 
effective).68 This decision is consistent with other cases requiring that, to be an 
effective disclaimer under subsection 2-312(2), language or circumstances must 
specifically call to the buyer's attention the fact that the seller is not claiming 
that he has title or that the seller is selling only such right or title as he is able to 
sell. Thus, typical quitclaim language in bills of sale, which recites that the 
seller is transferring his "right, title and interest," has been held to be ineffective 
to disclaim the warranty of title. 69 
Implied Warranties 
In Gall v. Allegheny County Health Dept.,70 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held the implied warranty of merchantability attached to the sale of water 
by a municipality through its municipal water system. It also held that the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose did not attach to such a sale. 
In that case, plaintiffs became ill with giardiasis71 after drinking water fur-
nished by the municipality. They sued the municipality and the municipal 
water authority for breach of both implied warranties. The trial court dismissed 
the complaint. On appeal, the commonwealth court affirmed on the ground that 
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. On 
66. 766 P.2d 1311, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1404 (Mont. 1989). 
67. There was a factual dispute as to whether the signs were in place when the buyer entered 
the pawn shop. Id. at 1312, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1405. The court said this dispute 
was irrelevant and treated the case as if the signs had been in place. 
68. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312 Official Comment 6 (title warranty not subject to 
U.C.C. § 2-316(3)). 
69. See Clark & Smith, supra note 25 at ii 3.03 ( 1984 & 1988 Cum. Supp.). 
70. 521 Pa. 68, 555 A.2d 786, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 379 (1989). See also Miller 
v. McKeesport Mun. Water Auth., 521 Pa. 77, 555 A.2d 790 (1987) (municipality and its water 
authority could be held liable in negligence and breach of contract for illness and economic loss 
caused by same tainted water involved in Gall case). 
71. Giardiasis is a disease caused by parasitic protozoa tha1 attack the intestines. See IV 
Encyclopaedia Britannica-Micropaedia 528 (1974) (entry under "Giardia lamblia"). 
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further appeal, the supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It 
concluded that the sale of water by a municipality was a sale of goods within 
U.C.C. article 2. The court then concluded that the implied warranty of 
merchantability72 was attached to the sale.73 Lastly, the court ruled that the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose74 did not attach to a sale of 
water for drinking or household purposes. 75 
In Koperwas u. Publix Supermarkets, lnc.,76 a Florida court of appeals, 
applying the "reasonable expectation" test, held that the presence of a clam 
shell in a can of clam chowder, as a matter of law, did not constitute lack of 
reasonable care in the manufacture of the chowder. In that case, the plaintiff 
injured her tooth when she bit down on the shell while eating the chowder. She 
sued both the supermarket from which she purchased the chowder and the 
manufacturer for breach of implied warranty. At the close of plaintiff's case, the 
trial court directed a verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed, 
stating that a consumer could reasonably anticipate and guard against a piece of 
clam shell in a bowl of clam chowder. 77 
Warranty Disclaimers 
Conspicuousness is one of the requirements under U.C.C. section 2-316(2) 
for disclaiming or modifying the implied warranties of merchantability or of 
fitness for a particular purpose. Whether a clause is conspicuous is a question of 
law. 78 The definition of "conspicuous" provides that, "[a] term or clause is 
conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to 
operate ought to have noticed it."79 The definition continues by declaring that a 
printed heading in capitals, or language in the body of a form that is printed in 
larger or other contrasting type or color, is conspicuous. 80 Suppose that the 
disclaimer language in a form is printed in contrasting type or color but is 
located on the back of the form so that a reasonable person might not have 
noticed it. Is it conspicuous? Courts are divided on the question. Some courts 
72. U.C.C. § 2-314. The court did not discuss whether either of the defendants was a merchant, 
possibly because the matter was not made an issue by the parties. 
73. Accord 35 Op. Comptroller, No. 79-880, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 330 (N.Y. 
Comp!. 1980); contra Coast Laundry Inc. v. Lincoln City, 9 Or. App. 521, 497 P.2d 1224, 10 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1379 ( 1972) (no implied warranties on theory that sale of water by 
municipality is not a sale of goods). 
74. U.C.C. § 2-315. Contra 35 Op. Comptroller, No. 79-880, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 330 (N.Y. 
Comp!. 1980). 
75. The court also ruled that plaintiffs had stated a claim under Pennsylvania's Governmental 
Immunities Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542(b)(5) (Purdon 1982). 
76. 534 So. 2d 872, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
77. Accord Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309, 2 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 161 (1964) (presence of fish bone in fish chowder does not constitute breach 
of implied warranties). But see O'Brien v. Ferguson Catering, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1434 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1988) (presence of bone in chicken pie constitutes breach of warranty). 
78. u.c.c. § 1-201(10). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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find location on the back of the form to be a factor in determining that the 
disclaimer is not conspicuous.81 Other courts find the clause not to be conspicu-
ous if there is not an adequate reference on the front of the form to the terms 
appearing on the back.82 The application of these principles is illustrated by 
Sierra Diesel Injection Service, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,83 decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In that case, the buyer purchased 
a computer and software for bookkeeping and invoicing. The purchased items 
did not perform as promised so the buyer purchased another computer from the 
same seller, which also did not perform as promised. A computer consultant 
retained by the buyer informed it that the computer was incapable of perform-
ing as promised. Consequently, the buyer purchased a replacement computer 
from another seller and sued the first seller. The trial court found for the buyer, 
concluding that the seller had breached its contract and the implied warranty of 
merchantability. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the 
seller's warranty disclaimers, which were printed in bold contrasting type, but 
on the reverse side of the form signed by the buyer, were not conspicuous. In so 
doing, the court relied upon the buyer's relative unsophistication in the areas of 
computers and contracts.84 
Third Party Beneficiaries Of Warranties 
Almost 25 years ago Prosser proclaimed the fall of the citadel of privity85 in 
warranty actions. Yet the passage of time has demonstrated that pockets of 
resistance still remain. This is so because lack of privity is still a defense in 
certain circumstances in many jurisdictions. The article 2 section intended to 
deal with privity (section 2-318) does not, in any of its recommended versions, 
abolish privity entirely. Further, some courts have declined to extend the partial 
abolition embodied in their state's version of section 2-318 to situations beyond 
that version. 
Thus in Gowen v. Cady,86 the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that lack of 
privity was a complete defense to a personal injury warranty action where the 
plaintiff was not within the class of persons for whom Georgia's U.C.C. section 
2-318 abolished privity. Georgia's section 2-318 abolishes privily for family 
members and guests in the buyer's home who might reasonably be expected to 
use and be injured by the product. 87 Mr. and Mrs. Cady sued the manufacturer 
81. Annot., 73 A.L.R. 3d 248 § 12[b] at 293-95 (1976 and 1989 Supp.). Often the buyer's lack 
of sophistication in legal matters is a factor as well. Id.§ 16[a] at 299-300 (1976 & 1989 Supp.). 
82. Id. at 294-95 (1976 & 1989 Supp.). See also Clark & Smith, supra note 25, at~ 8.03[2], 
text at nn:5o, 51 (1984 & 1988 Cum. Supp.) 
83. 874 F.2d 653, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 
84. The court also affirmed the breach of contract count. It concluded that the promise breached, 
which was contained in a letter sent by the seller to the buyer, had not been superceded by the 
buyer's later signing of the seller's form even though that form contained a merger clause. 
85. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966). 
86. 189 Ga. App. 473, 376 S.E.2d 390, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 384 (1989), cert. 
denied, 189 Ga. App. 912 (1989). 
87. Ga. Code Ann.§ 11-2-318 (1982). 
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of a medical device used by Mrs. Carly's doctor in a voluntary sterilization 
procedure performed upon Mrs. Cady. After the procedure, Mrs. Cady became 
pregnant and this suit ensued. The trial court granted summary judgment for 
the manufacturer on the warranty claim. On appeal, the court affirmed this 
decision upon the ground that neither plaintiff had been in privity with the 
manufacturer. The Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari.BB 
However, it is possible to evade privity limitations through the use of either 
an assignment or agency principles. The Illinois Supreme Court decision, 
Collins Co. v. Carboline Co.,B9 illustrates how an assignment of rights can be 
used to avoid a lack of privily. In that case, the court held that a plaintiff who 
was not within the class of those for whom the privity requirement had been 
abolished could satisfy the privity requirement by taking an assignment of rights 
from one who was in privity. There, the owners of a warehouse (Chicago Title 
and Wachovia) had a contractor install a new roofing system manufactured by 
Carboline. The manufacturer issued a written 10-year warranty to the owners. 
Some three years later, Collins purchased the warehouse. Two years after this 
purchase, the roof began to leak which limited Collins' use of the warehouse 
and required repair of the roof. Collins took an assignment of the original 
owners' warranty rights against the manufacturer. Collins then sued the manu-
facturer for economic loss in federal district court.90 That court gave judgment 
on the pleadings for the manufacturer. It ruled that Collins lacked privity and 
that the assignment of warranty did not create privity. On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit found Illinois law to be uncertain on whether the assignment created 
privity.91 It certified this issue to the Illinois Supreme Court, which decided that 
the assignment would place Collins in privity with the manufacturer.92 The 
supreme court left for the trial court to decide under U.C.C. subsection 2-210(2) 
whether the assignment was effective.93 Subsequently, based upon the Illinois 
Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's 
judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.94 
Agency principles also can be used to evade privity requirements. If there is 
just one party between the plaintiff and the manufacturer in the distribution 
chain, and if it can be shown that the intervening party is the agent of the 
88. See supra note 86. 
89. 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 616 (1988). 
90. Collins also sued the contractor who had installed the roof, as well as the architect whom 
Collins had hired to inspect the warehouse prior to purchasing it and who had opined that the 
roofing "looked in good shape." The claims against these parties were not in issue in the present 
case. 
91. Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 837 F.2d 299, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 273 (7th 
Cir. 1988). 
92. The opinion contains a useful collection and discussion of state and federal cases addressing 
the issue of assignability of warranty rights, 125 Ill. 2d at 513-14, 532 N.E.2d at 840-41, 7 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 625-26. 
93. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) permits assignment of all rights of seller or buyer unless either the parties 
agreed otherwise or the assignment would have a material adverse effect upon the nonassigning 
party. 
94. 864 F.2d 560, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 629 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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plaintiff or of the manufacturer, then the plaintiff is in privity with the 
manufacturer. 95 
PERFORMANCE 
Title, Creditors, and Good Faith Purchasers 
Creditors continue to ignore available protection against third party claims. 
In In re BR/ Corp.,96 a creditor-consignor asserted priority to the proceeds from 
the clothing it supplied to the debtor-consignee who subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy. Under U.C.C. section 2-326(3), a consignor must prove one of 
three things in order to protect its interest from the claims of consignee's 
creditors: (i) that he complied with a "sign law";97 (ii) that the debtor was 
"generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the 
goods of others"; or (iii) that he made an article 9 filing. 98 Since there was no 
sign law in Pennsylvania and the consignor had not made an article 9 filing, 
consignor had to prove that subsection 2-326(3)(b) was satisfied in order to 
protect his interests in the case. 
Courts tend to strictly interpret the language of U.C.C. section 2-326(3)(b). 
The factual test of proving that the buyer is "generally known by the buyer's 
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others" is almost 
never met.99 BR/ Corp. reinforces this trend. Despite proof that 250 of 600 
suppliers of BRI Corp. supplied goods on a consignment basis, the court said 
that this was not "most" of the suppliers. Moreover, the debtor had many 
nonsupplier creditors, and there was no evidence that any of these knew that the · 
debtor generally sold goods on a consignment basis. Given the scant evidence on 
which to base a decision that the buyer was "generally known" to sell on 
consignment, the court's conclusion seems correct. 
Although goods have never attained the status of full negotiability, the 
predominance of ostensible ownership concerns has been the impetus behind a 
gradual move toward a form of quasi-negotiability. Whether this halfway status 
is presently deserved is unclear, its hold on the judicial psyche is not. A perfect 
example is MBank-Waco, N.A. v. L. & }., Inc. 100 The dispute was over the 
respective rights of MBank and the Mamot family to the proceeds from the sale 
95. See, e.g., Costa v. Volkswagen of Am., 150 Vt. 213, 214 n.l, 551A.2d1196, 1197-98 n.1, 8 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389, 391 n.1 (1988) (buyer in privily with manufacturer where 
intervening dealer is agent of manufacturer); Irwin v. Lowe's, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 828, 302 S.E.2d 
734, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 450 (1983) (buyer in privity with manufacturer if 
intervening purchaser from manufacturer was acting as agent of buyer). 
96. 88 Bankr. 71, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1441 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
97. Only North Carolina and Mississippi have such laws. See N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 66-72 (1975); 
Miss. Code Ann.§ 15-3-7 (1972 & 1989 Cum. Supp.). 
98. U.C.C. § 9-408 permits a creditor to make an article 9 filing without prejudicing its right to 
assert that the transaction was a true consignment outside the transactional scope of article 9. 
99. See, e.g., Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga. App. 368, 323 
S.E.2d 259, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 116 (1984); In re Hoover Co., 16 Bankr. 435, 33 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (M.D. Pa. 1982). 
100. 754 S.W.2d 245, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1476 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). 
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of cattle ostensibly owned by Arnold Young, the "thief." Young and the 
Mamots had "a-man's-word-is-his-bond" type of relationship. 101 The Mamots 
supplied him with money to purchase cattle which he would fatten and sell with 
the understanding that the Mamots would be paid back from the proceeds. The 
cattle always bore Young's registered brand. 102 Unfortunately, as Young's 
financial condition began to deteriorate so did his honesty. During the 
1980-1981 cattle year, the Mamots were asked to pay for cattle that Young 
never intended to buy. Some of this money was returned to the Mamots to cover 
the previous year's obligations and the rest was used to finance all phases of 
Young's cattle business. Also during this period, Young gave MBank a security 
interest in "all cattle now owned or hereafter acquired." When his entire herd 
was later sold by MBank, the Mamots claimed equitable ownership of the 
proceeds under a constructive trust. 103 The trial court, emulating the wisdom of 
Solomon, divided the proceeds equally between MBank and the Mamots. 
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed. Without deciding whether the circum-
stances justified the imposition of a constructive trust, 1°' the court determined 
that MBank was a good faith purchaser for value and as such would prevail 
over an existing equitable title or interest. 105 Moreover, we are told that MBank 
would also prevail under article 9. In the view of the court, the beneficiary of a 
constructive trust is an unperfected lien creditor whose interest is subordinate to 
that of a perfected secured party. 106 With respect to the position of the Mamots 
that Young (a thief) could pass no interest in the cattle to MBank, the court 
101. This characterization is the court's. Id. at 247, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
1479. Surprisingly (considering that approximately $1.8 million was involved), no aspect of their 
relationship was reduced to writing. 
102. The Mamots knew this and admitted that their cattle was indistinguishable from the rest of 
Young's cattle. 
103. The Mamots argued that once they were able to trace their stolen funds to the purchase of 
some cattle, the burden shifted to MBank to identify the cattle purchased with and without their 
funds. Failing this, the Mamots laid claim to the entire herd. One could argue, however, that 
U.C.C. § 9-315 places the burden of identification squarely on the shoulders of the Mamots. See 
generally Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1 
(1985). 
104. For a discussion of the grounds for imposing a constructive trust, see generally G. Bogert, 
The Law of Trust and Trustees 471 et seq. (Rev. 2d ed. 1978); 5 A. Scott, Trusts 461 et seq. (4th 
ed. 1989). 
105. The court was careful to point out that MBank, as a preexisting secured creditor, did not 
qualify for protection under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) as a "buyer in ordinary course of business." MBank 
was, however, a good-faith purchaser. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (" '[p]urchase' includes taking by ... 
mortgage, pledge, lien."). As such, it "acquire[d] all title which [its] transferor had or had power to 
transfer." U.C.C. § 2-403(1 ). In this case, the court relied on pre-Code rules to reach the conclusion 
that Young had the "power" to transfer an interest, free of the alleged constructive trust. 
106. The court cited U.C.C. § 9-201. See also U.C.C. § 9-301(1 )(b) ("[A Jn unperfected security 
interest is subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security 
interest is perfected."). 
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decided that their conduct as a matter of law estopped them from disputing the 
priority interest of MBank. 107 
The twin assumptions on which the court's opinion rests are troubling, not 
because they are necessarily wrong but because they are made with a blind faith 
in their correctness. In the context of an existing constructive trust, it is by no 
means certain whether a secured party who has not relied on the debtor's 
ostensible ownership of property or who has not given value subsequent to the 
trust coming into existence is entitled to the protection accorded historically to 
good faith purchasers. 108 As far as the article 9 analysis is concerned, it might be 
argued that resolution of this sort of priority dispute is outside its scope. 109 
Cases continue to accumulate involving the extent to which non-Code law 
governs the transfer of title to goods. Again this year, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court has asserted the primacy of the Code. 110 In Alford v. Neal, 111 the court 
held that, as between buyer and seller, noncompliance with the motor vehicle 
certificate of title act does not prevent the transfer of title. The certificate is no 
more than prima facie evidence of ownership. In another case, In re Bellanca 
Aircraft Corp., 112 the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Code, not the Federal 
Aviation Act, determined whether the transfer of an interest in a plane is valid 
against creditors of the seller. Similarly, in Brink v. McNeil, 113 the Colorado 
Court of Appeals decided that the state's livestock bill of sale laws did not affect 
the U.C.C. mandated result. 
107. That conduct consisted of entrusting Young with possession and allowing him to place his 
brand on the cattle. 
108. Although a dissenting voice is occasionally heard (see In re Emery Corp., 38 Bankr. 489, 38 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 52 Bankr. 944, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1172 (D.C. Pa. 1985)), it is now well settled that the secured creditor has purchaser 
status when the competing claimant is a reclaiming seller (see infra notes 100-09 and accompanying 
text) but different policy considerations may call for a more restrictive reading of the Code's 
definition of purchaser when a constructive trust is at issue. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (definitions 
applicable "unless the context otherwise requires"). 
109. In the first place, it seems that the court is confusing a constructive trust with the dissimilar 
but functionally related (both serve to prevent unjust enrichment) equitable lien. Secondly, even if a 
constructive trust can properly be viewed as generating a lien, it does not seem to be one of the type 
to which the priority rule of U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) is directed. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) ("[A] 'lien 
creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or 
the like .... "). If not governed by a specific priority rule, can we say with confidence that the 
drafters intended for this contest to be settled by the general priority rule of U.C.C. § 9-201? 
110. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 
44 Bus. Law. 1445, 1462-63 (1989). 
111. 229 Neb. 67, 425 N.W.2d 325, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1457 (1988). 
112. In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 656 (8th 
Cir. 1988). 
113. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1466 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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Tender, Cure, and Notice of Breach 
In Leitchfield Development Corp. v. Clark, 114 a Kentucky appel\ate court, for 
the first time, had the opportunity to construe the relationship between U.C.C. 
sections 2-601 and 2-508. The court held that the "perfect ten~er rule" set forth 
in U.C.C. section 2-601 does not necessarily require a perfect t~nder in the first 
instance. 115 If the seller properly exercises its right of cure, a rejection of a 
nonconforming tender will not be permitted. In the case before it, the court 
reversed a judgment for the buyers of a mobile home which was predicated on 
an instruction to the jury that the buyers had the right to reject their home if it 
failed to "conform to their purchase contract in any respect." The alleged 
nonconformity was minor damage to one corner of the home which occurred 
during its delivery and which could have been repaired for $75. 
What makes Leitchfield a case worth reviewing is not so much what the court 
decided but, rather, what it did not decide. Under U.C.C. section 2-508(1 ), cure 
is allowed only if it can be accomplished within the "time for performance." 
The majority opinion is silent on when the seller's performance was due.116 The 
conclusion of Judge Wilhoit in a concurring opinion that in the absence of a 
specified delivery date, the actual delivery date was the time for performance, 
seems incorrect. It would be better to imply a reasonable delivery term under 
U.C.C. section 2-309( 1 ). 117 Also missing from the decision is a recognition of the 
divergence of opinion surrounding the application of subsection (2) of U.C.C. 
section 2-508.118 Must the seller show that it knew of the nonconformity at the 
time of delivery, or is it sufficient to prove only that it believed the home would 
be acceptable? 119 Finally, the court assumes that cure precludes an effective 
rejection. As another case in this year's survey teaches, this is probably not 
true. 12° Cure only makes the rejection wrongful. There is a difference. 
114. 757 S.W.2d 207, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1092 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). 
115. By its terms, U.C.C. § 2-601 permits the buyer to reject "if the goods or the tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract." 
116. The court does include the issue of whether the intention to cure was communicated to the 
buyers within the time allowed for performance as one of the questions of fact that may have to be 
decided by the jury on remand. 757 S.W.2d at 212, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1099. 
117. U.C.C. § 2-309(1) provides: "The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under 
a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time." 
118. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) provides: "Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the 
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the 
seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a 
conforming tender." 
119. Compare Meads v. Davis, 22 N.C. App. 479, 206 S.E.2d 868, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 40 ( 1974) ("Obviously this section deals with the situation in which the seller knows 
prior to delivery that the goods are not in conformity ... . ")with Joe Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated 
Edison Co., 107 Misc. 2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 426 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1980) ("compelling equitable considerations exist to extend the§ 2-508(2) remedy to those 
innocent sellers who have no prior predelivery knowledge of nonconformity"). 
120. See the discussion of Integrated Circuits Unlimited v. E.F. Johnson Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 695 (2d. Cir. 1989), infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text. 
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The Code requires that "[t]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he 
discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be 
barred from any remedy." 121 One recurring question is whether the need to give 
notice extends to persons who are not "buyers" of the goods involved, but are 
rather warranty beneficiaries. The answer continues to be in dispute. 122 In both 
Carlson v. Armstrong World lndustries123 and Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co.,1 24 the courts determined that non-privity plaintiffs are not required to give 
timely notice of breach. 125 In another case, Cooley v. Big Hom Harvestore 
Systems, /nc.,126 the Colorado Court of Appeals followed the middle-of-the-road 
position taken by that state's supreme court. 127 Recognizing that the need to give 
notice might depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, the court of 
appeals held that notice is necessary where the buyer is a commercial buyer and 
the damage is to property. At the other end of the spectrum is Allen v. G.D. 
Searle & Co. 128 The district court, applying Oregon law, ruled that even where 
the plaintiff is a consumer who is seeking to recover for personal injuries, notice 
must be given. 129 
Another issue on which courts cannot agree concerns the sufficiency of notice 
if given in a pleading. In Bednarski v. Hideout Homes & Realty, Inc., 130 the 
court, anticipating how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the 
matter, could see no reason why a litigation filing, if timely made, could not 
serve as adequate notification. On the other hand, the Allen 131 court on reconsid-
eration, held that notice given for the first time in a complaint is insufficient 
under Oregon law, as a matter of law. If the latter rule is accepted, exceptions 
121. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
122. The majority of courts hold that warranty beneficiaries need not give notice. See, e.g., 
Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1088 (Ala. 1979) 
(notice not required); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d 
513, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 737 (1972) (same); Mattos v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 
993, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 473 (1977) (same). But see Parillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 
1313, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 108 (R.I. 1981) (notice is required). See also Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-607 Official Comment 5 ("the reason of the section does extend to requiring 
the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred"). 
123. 693 F. Supp. 1073, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 751 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
124. 693 F. Supp. 1154, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 464 (N.D. Ga. 1988). 
125. Their conclusion follows from taking U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a)'s use of the word "buyer" 
literally. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) ("'Buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods."). 
126. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1051 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
127. The court of appeals cited Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1507 (Colo. 1980) (need to give notice might vary with the facts) and Palmer v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150 (Colo. 1984) (consumer excused 
from having to give notice). 
128. 708 F. Supp. 1142, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 983 (D. Or. 1989). 
129. The court relied on Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 512 P.2d 776, 13 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 10 (1973), as evidence that the pre-Code requirement of notice 
remains an essential element of a warranty claim. 
130. 709 F. Supp. 90, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1040 (M.D. Pa. 1988). 
131. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1046 (D. Or. 1989). For an earlier decision in this 
case, see supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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will invariably be required. For example, in Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco 
Industries, 132 the court believed that a pleading can be an acceptable means of 
notice in situations where the breach cannot reasonably be discovered until after 
the commencement of litigation. 133 
Finally, for those who have not yet learned to appreciate the importance of 
U.C.C. section 2-607(3 )(a) (both to buyers, as a prerequisite to recovery, and to 
sellers, as a basis for an affirmative defense), there is Fairhaven Textile Corp. v. 
Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, P.A. 134 Fairhaven involved a legal malprac-
tice action against the law firm that had represented the seller in a previous 
case. The district court held that the defendant firm's failure to raise the issue of 
notice was malpractice as a matter of law. Query whether the court's holding 
would be equally applicable to an attorney who fails to give notice on behalf of 
the buyer? 
Repudiation 
Although U.C.C. section 2-609 was intended to free the aggrieved party from 
having to make the oftentimes difficult decision whether the other party has 
"repudiated" the contract, the section has as much potential to be a mine field as 
it does a haven. 135 A case that makes this point very nicely is Scott v. Crown. 136 
Buyer (Crown) and seller (Scott) entered into a series of contracts for the sale of 
U.S. No. 1 wheat. Each contract provided for full payment by buyer 30 days 
after complete performance by seller. Seller, after having performed the first 
contract, but before payment was due, was told by his banker that buyer was 
not the "best grain trader" and was informed by the Department of Agriculture 
of a pending complaint against buyer concerning payments to other farmers. As 
a consequence of this information and nonpayment by another buyer, seller told 
buyer's driver, who had come for more wheat, that there would be no further 
deliveries until contact was made with Mr. Crown "to settle some questions." 
Buyer responded with two letters. In the first, he demanded performance; in the 
second, he cancelled the contracts subject to reinstatement should seller resume 
performance. Seller, through counsel, replied with a letter demanding assur-
ances of performance, that is, early payment for all wheat that had previously 
been delivered. When payment was not made, seller filed suit and the buyer 
132. 686 F. Supp. 1319, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 429 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
133. In addition, the court stated two rules regarding notice; one for merchants, another for 
retail consumers. Consumers can, even in the unexceptional case, give notice through litigation 
filings. 686 F. Supp. at 1340, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 449. 
134. 695 F. Supp. 71, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 780 (0. N.H. 1988). 
135. To obtain a clear repudiation, a party who has "reasonable grounds for insecurity" may 
"demand adequate assurance of due performance" under U.C.C. § 2-609(1 ). Subsection ( 4) of§ 2-
609 provides that "failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such 
assurance of due performance" is a "repudiation of the contract." But when does one have 
reasonable grounds for insecurity and what assurances are adequate? These are only two of the 
several new issues that the section creates. 
136. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 464 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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counterclaimed. The trial court gave judgment for seller on both its claim and 
the counterclaim. 
On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. Although it conceded 
that reasonable grounds for seller's insecurity might have existed, the court 
ruled that the timing, form, and content of the demand for assurances of 
performance were fatally defective. First, the court addressed the adequacy of 
the statement made to buyer's driver. Despite the fact that the Code mandates a 
written demand for assurances, the court recognized the possibility that an oral 
demand would suffice. 137 Such would be the case if, for example, it were clearly 
understood that if assurances were not forthcoming there would be a suspension 
of performance. Unfortunately for seller, the statement to the driver did not 
unequivocally indicate what was required and the consequences of noncompli-
ance. Nor did the later written demand justify a suspension of performance. 
According to the court, the seller had no right to force a modification of the 
contract by requesting payment before it was due. Therefore, it was seller who 
repudiated and was in breach of the contracts. 
The court's conclusion that a demand for assurances is ineffective if compli-
ance would effect a modification of the contract is less than convincing. 138 It 
seems that the very concept of assurances envisions the giving of something to 
which the demanding party was not originally entitled. Also unclear is why a 
requested assurance which is later deemed excessive should vitiate the demand 
entirely. Perhaps the demanding party would be wise to leave the choice of 
assurances to the other party, making only suggestions as to what would be 
acceptable. 
REMEDIES 
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance 
Does the delivery of conforming goods to the buyer necessarily entitle the 
seller to the purchase price? The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said it did 
not in Integrated Circuits Unlimited v. E. F. Johnson Co. 139 Involved was the 
purported rejection of 17 4 microprocessors which the district court found to be 
in conformity with contract specifications. 14° Following their rejection, buyer 
137. Id. at 468. Not all courts would agree. In fact, during this survey period two courts decided 
otherwise. See Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., 686 F. Supp. 1319, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 429 (N.D. Ill. 1988); USX Corp. v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 753 S.W.2d 845, 
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 100 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). 
138. A similar conclusion has surfaced in at least one other case. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des 
Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931 
(Callaghan) (7th Cir. 1976). 
139. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 695 (2d Cir. 1989). 
140. It is interesting to note that 1,973 microprocessors had been delivered and, except for 174, 
all were found to be unacceptable although only 130 microprocessors were actually tested. This was 
held to be statistically sufficient to justify a conclusion that the similar untested devices were also 
defective. See generally Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to 
Professor Kaye, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 78 (1987); Kay, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients 
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held the microprocessors in storage for three months, during which time the 
seller refused to accept their return. 141 The Second Circuit found no error in the 
trial court's conclusion that although buyer's rejection of the 17 4 units was 
substantively wrongful, it was, nevertheless, procedurally effective. 142 The dis-
tinction is significant. If the goods have been effectively rejected, that precludes, 
by negative implication, their acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-606(1 )(b). 143 If 
there has been no acceptance, the seller is barred from recovering the contract 
price under U.C.C. section 2-709. 144 Still, a wrongful rejection is a breach and 
the buyer remains liable for damages. Unfortunately for the seller in Integrated 
Circuits, it could establish none. Not having retaken possession of the goods, the 
seller could not resell the goods and recover under U.C.C. section 2-706; 
recovery under U.C.C. section 2-708( 1) was precluded because the contract and 
market prices were, at all relevant times, the same; and loss volume seller status 
could not be established which would entitle the seller to its lost profit under 
U.C.C. section 2-708(2). The end result was a net credit and judgment in favor 
of the buyer for $10,359 .145 
Although the decision in Integrated Circuits appears to be consistent with the 
language of the Code146 and the intention of its drafters,147 as a matter of policy, 
its soundness is questionable. If the buyer has accepted the tender before seeking 
to return the goods, their return can be refused by the seller and the buyer 
remains liable for the price. 148 If the buyer has not accepted the goods, then their 
and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 54 ( 1987); James, Relevancy, Probability and the 
Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689 (1941). 
141. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b) imposes on a buyer the duty to hold rejected goods, in which he does 
not have a security interest, "with reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to 
permit the seller to remove them." Because buyer had done all that it was required to do, the district 
court held that any loss occasioned by a subsequent fall in the market price of microprocessors must 
be borne by seller. The district court's opinion appears at 691 F. Supp. 630, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1478 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
142. An effective rejection refers to a rejection timely made and properly communicated to the 
seller without regard to its justification. 
143. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
( 1) Acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer .... fails to make an effective rejection 
(subsection (1) of§ 2-602 .... (emphasis added). 
144. The statement in the text assumes that the goods have not been lost or damaged and that a 
substitute disposition for a reasonable price is possible. See U.C.C. § 2-709. 
145. The credit was the difference between the total contract price of all parts rejected by the 
buyer ($171,084) and payments withheld on seller's account ($160,725). The judgment of the 
district court in favor of the seller for $4638.73 was reversed because no credit was given for the 
parts wrongfully, but effectively, rejected. As the Second Circuit correctly pointed out, to refuse a 
credit "would be tantamount to awarding [seller] the price of the goods returned or of its lost profits 
which, on these facts ... is unauthorized by the Code." 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 700. 
146. See supra note 143. 
147. See, e.g., Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 241 (1963). 
148. It would seem from a reading of the Code that it is not possible to avoid liability for the 
contract price by making procedurally effective but substantively wrongful revocation of acceptance. 
See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 296-97 (3d ed. 1988). 
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return cannot be refused by the seller. It is not clear that the seller's usual 
ability to effect a more efficient disposition of the goods justifies making the 
seller choose, at its risk, which course to pursue. 149 
Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 150 considered several 
issues involving the remedy of revocation. Andover Air Limited Partnership 
("Andover") purchased a Piper Cheyenne 1A aircraft with a five-year warranty 
from a Piper dealer. Approximately one year later, the plane was forced to 
make a gear-up landing, necessitating substantial repairs. Andover sued Piper 
Aircraft Corporation ("Piper"), the manufacturer of the plane, alleging that a 
defective uplock hook assembly caused the accident. 
The first issue concerned the right of Andover to seek both revocation and 
damages for breach of warranty. Piper argued that to assert two mutually 
exclusive remedies in a pleading is an act of bad faith and should not be 
permitted. The court correctly rejected this contention.151 Although the ag-
grieved party's freedom to choose its remedy is not unlimited, there is no reason 
why the remedial flexibility inherent in article 2 should not be preserved, at 
least through the pleading stage. 
The next issue in Andover Air concerned the availability of revocation against 
Piper, a non-privity manufacturer. The statutory impediment is the use of the 
words "the seller" in U.C.C. section 2-608. The Code defines a seller as one 
who "sells or contracts to sell goods,"152 and defines a "sale" as "the passing of 
title from the seller to the buyer for a price."153 As a consequence, most courts 
have held that a buyer can revoke only against its immediate seller. 154 Appar-
ently seeing no significance in the assumption of warranty liability by Piper, the 
district court assumed that Massachusetts courts would agree with the majority 
of cases. Hence, in the absence of a principal/agent relationship between the 
manufacturer and dealer,155 revocation is available only against the latter. 
Another issue was whether Andover's use, repair, and maintenance of the 
plane prior to the accident or its use of the plane following the accident 
precluded revocation. The court stated that the questions of substantial change 
149. As a practical matter, depending upon the buyer's solvency and other factors, the seller may 
wish to retake possession of the goods regardless of its obligation to do so. 
150. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (D. Mass. 1989). 
151. In reaching its conclusion, the court cited rules ~(e)(2) & 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and several cases, including Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker 
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977) and General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
824 (N.M. 1985). 
152. u.c.c. § 2-103(1)(d). 
153. U.C.C. § 2-106(1). 
154. See, e.g., Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 45 (6th Cir. 1974); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 
P.2d 210, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1450 (Ariz. 1981); Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 
227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 120 (1984). 
155. Such a relationship was found and revocation was permitted against the manufacturer in 
Costa v. Volkswagen of Am., 150 Vt. 213, 551A.2d1196, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389 
(1988). 
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caused by preaccident use and the reasonableness of the postaccident use 
presented questions of fact for resolution at trial. 156 
U.C.C. section 2-608 permits revocation "of a lot or commercial unit." What 
constitutes a "lot"157 was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in S& R 
Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. ( America). 158 In that case, C. Itoh contracted to 
sell to S & R 5,500 metric tons of steel in coils of varying widths and thickness. 
After having sold about 35% of the steel, S & R learned from a customer that the 
14-gauge steel was defective. It then sought to revoke acceptance of the entire 
amount of steel still in its possession, including gauges that were not shown to 
be nonconforming. The district court permitted revocation and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. The circuit court refused to limit revocation to those "commer-
cial units" that proved to be nonconforming, that is, the 14-gauge steel. The 
court held that the provision pertaining to revocation of a lot does not depend 
upon multiple deliveries. Where goods are delivered in a single lot, the right to 
revoke extends to the entirety. 
To conclude, one other case is worth mention. In Herbert v. Harl, 159 the 
buyers sought to revoke their acceptance of a used automobile. What they did 
not do was tender a properly executed reassignment of the certificate of 
ownership that complied with the state's motor vehicle and licensing statutes. In 
dicta, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that this rendered the attempted 
revocation ineffective. 160 This seems wrong on two counts. First, U.C.C. section 
2-401 ( 4) provides that title automatically revests in the seller upon revocation. 
Second, a requirement that the buyer tender a completed certificate of owner-
ship does not give recognition to the buyer's security interest under U.C.C. 
section 2-711(3). This case is simply another example of the growing tension 
between the Code and the plethora of commercial statutes external to the Code. 
Reclamation 
The cases continue to demonstrate the tenuous nature of the reclamation 
rights of unpaid sellers. In particular, consider the frequent efforts of sellers to 
156. Whether continued use of goods is at odds with revocation of acceptance will often depend 
on the following factors: 
[T]he seller's instructions to the buyer after revocation of acceptance; the degree of economic 
and other hardship that the buyer would suffer if he discontinued using the good; the 
reasonableness of continued use after revocation as a method for mitigating damages; the degree 
of prejudice to the seller; and whether the seller acted in good faith. 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1501 (citing Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor 
Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 658, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 558, 563 (Minn. 1981)). 
157. The term "lot" is defined as "a parcel or a single article which is the subject matter of a 
separate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the contract." U.C.C. § 2-105(5). 
158. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 61 (9th Cir. 1988). 
159. 757 S.W.2d 585, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 740 (Mo. 1988). 
160. Id. at 590, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 746. The court failed to recognize that 
revocation is not an ordinary course transfer of ownership. One suspects that the statutes were never 
intended to govern transfers to involuntary transferees. 
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reclaim, under U.C.C. section 2-702, goods that are subject to the interest of a 
secured party (as a good faith purchaser) who financed the buyer's inventory. 
Despite the fact that the vast majority of courts hold that the interest of the 
unpaid seller is subordinate to the lien of the secured party, 161 sellers still do 
battle, emboldened either by the factual nuances of their respective cases or the 
cleverness of their arguments. 
A somewhat different factual setting was involved in O'Brien v. Chandler. 162 
What distinguished this case from most was the method of delivery and the 
alleged terms of the agreement between the seller and buyer. Neither of those 
matters prevented the New Mexico Supreme Court from affirming the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the secured party. The seller of 
cattle delivered them to a feedlot for later delivery to the buyer. All the buyer 
ever received were invoices which described the cattle and set out the sale price. 
In his deposition, the seller testified that the buyer could, after inspection, reject 
any or all of the cattle. 163 After the buyer inspected the cattle, but before 
selecting those which he would keep, he used the cattle as collateral to secure a 
loan from his bank. 
The court started its analysis with the statement that "[t]he specific agree-
ment between buyer and seller is simply not a material issue. What is material 
is the fact that delivery was made by a seller to a buyer, and that fact is not in 
dispute."164 With that said, the case was cast in the mold of the familiar and so, 
too, was most of the court's reasoning. It concluded that the buyer obtained 
voidable title to the cattle with the consequent power to transfer good title 
(security interest) to the bank, a bona fide purchaser without notice of the 
seller's claim.165 The court was also not persuaded by the seller's position that it 
had a perfected article 2 security interest166 under U.C.C. section 9-113167 
because of a state statute providing that possession of livestock without a 
161. Although involving an attempt at reclamation by an unpaid cash seller under U.C.C. § 2-
507, In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 577 (5th Cir. 1975), 
rev'd on reh'g en bane, 526 F.2d 1238, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 545 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), is generally considered the landmark case upholding the priority of the 
secured creditor. 
162. 107 N.M. 797, 765P.2d1165, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1450 (1988). 
163. The seller also testified that notwithstanding the fact that the invoices set out the sale price, 
it was expected that a price would be negotiated for any cattle which the buyer chose to keep. 
164. Id. at 799, 765 P.2d at 1167, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1453. The court went 
on to characterize the transaction as a "sale or return." Id. at 799, 765 P.2d at I 167, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1454. Once the court decided that a contract for sale existed, it is surprising 
that it even considered parol evidence concerning the return aspect of the agreement. See U.C.C. 
§ 2-326(4) ("Any 'or return' term of a contract for sale is to be treated as a separate contract for sale 
within the statute of frauds section of this Article ... and as contradicting the sale aspect of the 
contract within the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence .... "). 
165. The seller also contended that it had successfully stopped delivery of the cattle under 
U.C.C. § 2-705 before the buyer was notified by the feedlot that goods were being held for him. 
There was, however, no evidence that any attempt was made to stop delivery before the security 
interest was given to the bank. 
166. Although the court never mentions the source of the alleged article 2 security interest, it 
presumably would have arisen under U.C.C. § 2-401 ("Any retention or reservation by the seller of 
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document of title is prima facie evidence that possession is unlawful. 168 Even if a 
perfected article 2 security interest existed, the seller could not reclaim after the 
expiration of the 10-day period provided by U.C.C. section 2-702: 
Perhaps the seller would have met with more success had he not character-
ized himself as a "seller." Could he not have argued that, prior to the buyer's 
selection of cattle there was no contract of sale, but rather an offer to sell cattle 
then bailed with the feedlot? The case also serves as a reminder of how poorly 
U.C.C. section 9-113 works to bridge the gap between articles 2 and 9. 169 
In Estate of Schomer v. Piggot, 170 the seller attempted to use an equal 
protection challenge to the secured party's priority. Seller argued that equal 
protection of the laws was denied because the Code gives sophisticated and 
experienced bankers an unfair advantage over less sophisticated and experi-
enced farmers. The Iowa Supreme Court quite properly rejected this attempt to 
make the operation of the Code's rules vary with the relative business savvy of 
the parties. · 
Buyer's Money Remedies and Their Limitations 
The basic statutory formula of U.C.C. section 2-714(2) is simple: "[t]he 
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount." Reflection on a trio of recent 
cases involving this subsection reveals that its application is oftentimes not so 
simple. 
In the first case, Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc., 171 Nelson sued for breach 
of an implied warranty of merchantability on a used car. The jury awarded 
Nelson $3500. The trial judge set aside the verdict for lack of sufficient evidence 
on damages. 172 On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
reversed. The court found no merit in Nelson's contention that the jury could 
infer that the car was essentially worthless173 on the basis of his testimony that 
the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a 
security interest."). 
167. U.C.C. § 9-113 provides that an article 2 security interest is perfected "so long as the 
debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods." 
168. See N.M.S.A. §§ 77-9-21 and 77-9-22 (1978). 
169. See generally Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution 
of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 Yale L.J. 907 
(1978). 
170. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 513 (Iowa 1989). 
171. 370 S.E.2d 734, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 116 (W. Va. 1988). 
172. One can readily see what motivated the trial judge to set aside the verdict. The jury's award 
gave Nelson the purchase price and let him keep the car. 
173. In this regard the supreme court's opinion is inconsistent. At the outset we are told that the 
jury returned a verdict in the amount of $3500. Id. at 735, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
116. Later in the opinion, the court refers to a $3400 award which presumably was based on a 
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he did not drive the car due to its condition. 174 The trial judge erroneously failed 
to admit repair bills in the amount of $455.04. The appellate court made the 
point that if the contract price represents value that a good should have had, the 
contract price less repair costs may be the actual value of the good accepted. 115 
Thus, no special circumstances are needed for justifying the admissibility of 
repair costs. 176 
In the second case, Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 177 the district court was faced 
with a claim for damages for breach of the warranty of title and fraud. ]. W. 
Goolsby sold a truck tractor to Crook Motor Co. for $48,000. Crook Motor sold 
the tractor to Battle Creek Ford for $54,000. Battle Creek sold to another 
person for more than $69,000. Events established that the vehicle had been 
stolen before the sale to Crook Motor. Crook Motor was obliged to refund the 
purchase price to Battle Creek. Crook Motor then sued Goolsby and all others 
in the chain of preceding sales for breach of warranty of good title under U.C.C. 
section 2-312( 1) and fraud. 
Against both Goolsby and Buddy Simmons (the initial seller of the truck), the 
court awarded damages of $54,000. Goolsby's liability under U.C.C. section 2-
714(2) was assumed to be the $48,000 purchase price. Since Crook Motor never 
received good title, the actual value was zero and the court assumed the truck's 
value would have been $48,000, which was the purchase price. The remainder 
of the award consisted of incidental and consequential damages under U.C.C. 
section 2-715.178 The court computed Simmons's liability differently. The court 
purported to assess damages using a "benefit of the bargain" formula. 179 
Although the tractor on resale had eventually brought $69,793, the court 
finding that the car, when delivered, was worth $100. Id. at 736 n.4, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 118 n.4. 
174. Although admissible on the issue of value, the testimony of Nelson, standing alone, was 
held insufficient to establish the value of the vehicle. 
175. Obviously this may not always be true. The value goods would have had may be more or 
less than the contract price. The actual diminished value of goods may not, in some cases, be 
captured by repair costs. Nonetheless, repair costs are certainly relevant and with proper foundation 
should be admitted in a damage case built on U.C.C. § 2-714(2). 
176. The trial court apparently believed that the admissibility of repair bills depended upon a 
showing of "special circumstances." The supreme court correctly recognized that a showing of 
special circumstances is necessary only if one is attempting to show that the entire formula of 
U.C.C. § 2-714(2) is inappropriate. 
177. 703 F. Supp. 511, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 363 (N.0. Miss. 1988). 
178. Because Goolsby knew he was selling to a used truck dealer he was liable to Crook Motor 
for its out-of-pocket expenses in preparing the truck for resale ($450.57) and the lost profit on the 
resale to Battle Creek ($5,549.43). Crook Motor's claim for damages for loss of good will and 
business reputation was held to be too speculative to be allowed. 
179. Buddy Simmons was held liable on a non-Code misrepresentation theory. Crook Motor 
could not recover for breach of the warranty of title since that warranty was held to protect only the 
immediate purchaser and not run with the goods. U.C.C. § 2-721, however, states that "[r]emedies 
for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this Article for non-
fraudulent breach." Although no mention was made of U.C.C. § 2-714(2), it seems reasonable to 
assume that because of the stated equivalency between fraud and contract remedies, it was the 
governing section. It should also be mentioned that, in addition to the general damages award of 
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refused to use that figure as a benchmark. Rather, it used the price of $54,000 
for which Crook Motor sold to Battle Creek as an upper limit on recovery. 
According to the court, anything else would have been a windfall. 
The decision in Crook Motor is of interest insofar as it forces a rethinking of a 
basic remedial policy issue. To what extent should the actual loss established by 
events subsequent to the breach cap or mandate the application of a particular 
measure of damages? 180 If it is a correct inference that the value of the tractor at 
the time and place of acceptance (assuming good title) exceeded the $54,000 sale 
price, then the higher value rather than the purchase price should have been the 
benchmark for damage calculations under section 2-714(2). Yet, later events 
showed that an award based on this figure would have yielded more than the 
buyer would have obtained by the seller's full performance. Whether the court's 
adjustment of the damage formula of section 2-714(2) under these circumstances 
is good policy is a question far too complex for adequate treatment in the 
context of this survey. 181 It suffices to say that an award which appears 
overcompensatory may not be once the costs of litigation (both those that are 
measurable but not legally recoverable and those that are immeasurable) are 
taken into account. 
The third case, Costa v. Volkswagen of America,182 highlights the judicial 
system's inadequacies all too clearly. Costa bought an Audi 5000 in 1979 for 
$11,530. During the next several months he noticed many problems. After 
unsuccessful repair attempts, Costa revoked acceptance. He then commenced 
this suit for breach of express warranty. The jury awarded Costa $13,000, and 
on the verdict form wrote: "The Jury's verdict for plaintiff is with the stipula-
tion that the title to the 1979 Audi 5000 be awarded to Volkswagen of America, 
Inc." The trial judge granted a new trial in the belief that the jury wrongly 
based its award upon a theory of rescission. The case was retried to the court 
and this time a judgment for the defendant was entered. 
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court determined that there should have 
been no new trial on the issue of liability. The jury had been correctly instructed 
on the requirements for an effective revocation and the mandate on the verdict 
form was consistent with that remedy. The trial court had compounded its error 
by instructing the jury that damages after revocation were to be calculated using 
the formula of section 2-714(2). 183 This is obviously wrong. That formula 
$54,000, Simmons was found liable for punitive damages of $80,000 and a reasonable attorney's fee 
yet to be assessed. 
180. For a sampling of some of the many different fact patterns involving this problem, see J. 
White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 243-265 (3d ed. 1988). 
181. This subject was one of the topics discussed at the meeting of the subcommittee on General 
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title in Houston, Texas (Spring 1989). 
182. 150 Vt. 213, 551 A.2d 1196, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389 (1988). 
183. Where the buyer "rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance" general damages are 
recoverable under U.C.C. § 2-712 (cover) or U.C.C. § 2-713 (market price/contract price differen-
tial). U.C.C. §§ 2-71 l(l)(a) & (b). Another case where the court failed to fully understand the 
remedial scheme of article 2 is Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (D. Mass. 1989) (mistaken assumption that revocation does not permit 
U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions 2319 
applies only if the buyer retains the goods. Thus, a third trial was necessitated 
on the issue of damages. 
The case shows a plaintiff heading toward trial for a third time after eight 
years of litigation. The root of the problem was the trial judge's lack of 
appreciation for the distinction among remedies allowed under article 2. In 
particular, the judge instructed the jury on section 2-714(2) when it was 
inapplicable. 
Protracted litigation was also a fate faced by the buyers in Nachazel v. 
Miraco Manufacturing. 184 The case arose from the purchase of hog farrowing 
houses and nurseries known as Mirahuts. The buyers alleged and the jury 
found that the plaintiff stopped using the huts after two years because they were 
worthless. The jury awarded damages under U.C.C. section 2-714(2) for the 
decrease in value, and under U.C.C. section 2-715 for lost profits. Additionally, 
the trial court allowed the jury to consider, as items of consequential damages, 
interest on a purchase price loan and the cost of installing the defective huts. 
The court of appeals disagreed. It held that since the warranty was breached 
after the interest and installation expenses were incurred, the requisite causal 
connection between the breach and the loss was lacking. 
However, the Iowa Supreme Court thought differently. 185 Turning first to the 
issue of interest, the court drew a distinction between a buyer who retains the 
goods and one who revokes acceptance or rejects the goods. 186 With respect to the 
former, the court determined that as a matter of policy (what policy we are 
never told) interest is not recoverable. 187 Why not, however, permit the buyer to 
recover interest on that portion of the purchase price which is effectively rebated 
in the form of diminished value damages under section 2-714(2)? 188 To the 
court's credit, this is seen as an option. To its discredit, it is rejected as too 
difficult to ascertain. 189 Turning next to the cost of installation, the court held 
that it may be recovered provided the seller was credited with whatever value or 
benefit the buyer received. 
A final observation: rather than remand for an inevitable second trial, buyers 
were given the opportunity to file a remittitur in an amount equal to the interest 
recovery of benefit of the bargain damages). For more on this case see supra notes 150-56 and 
accompanying text. 
184. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 469 (Iowa 1988). 
185. Regardless of the type of consequentials involved, there must be a showing that the seller at 
the time of contracting had reason to know of the possible loss. U.C.C. § 2-715{2)(a). Although the 
jury was never instructed on this requirement, the point was not raised on appeal. 
186. The seller argued that no expense could be recovered if it would have been incurred in spite 
of the breach. If this narrow view of consequentials had been accepted by the court, the distinction 
drawn would have been unnecessary. 
187. What policy considerations mandate that interest should be recoverable when the goods are 
returned to the seller is equally unclear. The opinion is helpful in that it does contain quite a 
number of citations to cases on both sides of the issue. 
188. A portion or the interest expense will be returned to the buyer in the guise or statutory 
prejudgment interest which, in Iowa, accrues from the date of the commencement of the action. 
Iowa Code § 535.3 ( 1987). 
189. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 477. 
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cost and one-half the installation cost. The court's ultimate disposition of the 
appeal reflects a refreshing pragmatism that should serve as a lesson to others. 
Schmaltz v. Nissen 190 involved a sale of corn seed where there were disclaim-
ers of warranties and limitations on damages. The buyer argued unconscion-
ability under U.C.C. sections 2-302(2) and 2-719, because he was left with the 
dismally inadequate remedy of return of the purchase price when the defective 
seed did not produce a crop. A similar case was decided in favor of the buyer-
farmer in South Dakota in 1985 191 but was overruled by statute in 1986.192 
However, in Schmaltz, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the 1986 
legislation should not be applied retroactively since the cause of action arose in 
1981. The 1986 legislation did not specifically provide that it was to apply 
retroactively, so the court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding the 
disclaimer of warranties and limitation of damages unconscionable. 
The court analyzed the situation as one of unequal bargaining power, and 
found that the buyer-farmers were not in a position to bargain for more 
favorable terms. 193 At a loss for a remedy in a case that presented a sympathetic 
buyer, the court found unconscionability even in the face of contrary legislative 
intent. The court's opinion, read with the two concurring opinions, seems to 
suggest that warranty exclusions on seed are unconscionable virtually as a 
matter of law .194 Presumably this attitude by the court is what gave rise to the 
express legislative abrogation in 1986. 
Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Engineering, lnc. 195 reexamines the much-debated 
question of what happens when a contract contains both a "limited remedy" 
provision and an exclusion of consequential damages, and the limited remedy 
fails in its essential purpose. The Virginia Supreme Court sided with those 
courts which have respected consequential damage exclusions even where Jim-
190. 431 N.W.2d 657, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1061 (S.D. 1988). 
191. See Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'I, 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1244 (S.D. 1985). 
192. The new law provides: "The ruling in ... Hanson v. Funk Seeds International ... is 
hereby abrogated." 1986 S.D. Laws 410. 
193. In two other cases decided during this survey period buyer-farmers did not fare as well. See 
Peacock v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 688 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (exclusion 
of consequentials in the directions for use of herbicide was not unconscionable); Earl Brace & Sons 
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 690 (W.D. Pa. 1989) 
(same). 
194. The concurring opinion of Justice Sabers, for example, attacks the crafty ways in which the 
packaging industry tries to bypass the U.C.C. requirement of conspicuousness in warranty disclaim-
ers. It is suggested that a possible method for making these disclaimers conscionable and giving the 
buyer a real choice is to sell a product with a warranty for x amount, and to sell the same product 
without a warranty for the same amount less the value of the warranty. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1073. 
195. 234 Va. 583, 364 S.E.2d 215, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (1988). 
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ited remedies have failed. 196 The court held that it should not "rewrite the 
agreement" 197 of the parties. 
Seller's Money Remedies 
North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. Direct Mail Specialist 198 consid-
ered a seller's right to recover prejudgment interest on the unpaid portion of the 
contract price as incidental damages. 199 North American Foreign Trading Corp. 
("NAFTC") entered into an agreement to sell 164,968 units of a blackjack 
game to Direct Mail Specialist ("DMS"). DMS gave NAFTC a $100,000 
deposit to be applied only to the last shipment. DMS repudiated the contract 
after NAFTC had delivered only 60,000 units. NAFTC commenced this action 
shortly thereafter, in late 1983. According to NAFTC, its attempts to resell the 
undelivered units were largely unavailing until mid-1986 when a single pur-
chaser began buying the units at a price below the original price. Before the 
district court was NAFTC's motion for a determination of the proper method of 
calculating the amount of prejudgment interest to which it would be entitled 
should it prevail. 
The court had two methods to choose from. NAFTC urged that interest was 
recoverable on the full contract price until the resale in mid-1986 and thereafter 
on the difference between the contract price and the resale price. DMS, on the 
other hand, took the position that interest was permitted on the net amount of 
damages only, that is, the contract price less the amount received upon resale. 200 
The court agreed with NAFTC.201 Relying on the language of U.C.C. section 
196. This survey period saw the division or authority grow even greater. Compare Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. or Maryland v. Krebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 89 
(7th Cir. 1988) (exclusion or consequentials held to be invalid) and Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v. 
Piper Aircraft Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (D. Mass. 1989) (withdrawn as a 
result or settlement) with Employers Ins. v. Suwanee River SPA Lines, Inc., 866 F.2d 752, 8 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659 (5th Cir. 1989) (exclusion or consequentials remains valid). 
See generally Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of 
Consequential Damages: An Objective Approach, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 551 (1987) and Mather, 
Consequential Damages When Exclusive Repair Remedies Fail: Uniform Commercial Code Section 
2-719, 38 S.C.L. Rev. 673 (1987). 
197. 234 Va. at 593, 364 S.E.2d at 220, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1502. 
198. 697 F. Supp. 163, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
199. Authorization for the seller's recovery or incidental damages is found in U.C.C. § 2-710. 
200. H the three-year delay was reasonable, the measure or NAFTC's recovery would be the 
difference between the resale price and the contract price under U.C.C. § 2-706. DMS argued that 
the applicable New York statute restricted any computation or interest to this amount. See N.Y. Civ. 
Prac. Law§ 5001(a) (McKinney 1963) ("Interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because 
or a breach or performance or a contract. ... "). 
201. The court finessed its way around the limiting New York statute by juggling labels. Rather 
than label the time value or money loss as statutory damages, it considered it "incidental" damages 
recoverable under the Code without regard to any external statute. The court did, however, view the 
statute as setting the appropriate rate or interest. 
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2-709,202 it held that interest could be recovered on the contract price (less the 
$100,000 deposit) "from the date of breach until the time at which the seller 
could reasonably have resold the goods with reasonable effort for a reasonable 
price. " 203 
Despite its inconsistency with the language of New York's prejudgment 
interest statute, the decision makes good sense. If a remedy is to substitute for 
performance,204 the seller's actual ability to resell must be considered. The 
assumption underlying U.C.C. sections 2-706 and 2-708 is that a ready market 
for the goods exists. Thus, the buyer should have to pay interest on only that 
portion of the original contract price which cannot be recaptured from the 
marketplace. Where this assumption proves incorrect, the Code makes the buyer 
responsible for the contract price and liability for delay damages for the buyer's 
nonpayment should follow. This is true even if the buyer's principal obligation 
is subsequently modified because of a later resale. To hold otherwise would 
have the untoward effect of reducing the seller's overall recovery if the invitation 
to resell under U.C.C. section 2-709(2) is accepted.205 
On rare occasion, a case will come to trial before the time for the seller's 
tender of the goods. If the market price of the goods is needed to calculate the 
seller's damages, U.C.C. section 2-723( 1) directs that the relevant date for its 
determination is "the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudia-
tion." This provision was considered in Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples 
Natural Gas Co. 206 
Peoples Gas allegedly contracted with Manchester to purchase natural gas. 
The contract was to run for a period of 10 years and contained several 
provisions which are commonly found in long-term gas purchase contracts and 
which impact on the price during its term.207 Soon after negotiations had been 
completed, Peoples Gas perceived a "softening" of the market, denied the 
contract's existence, and refused to buy. Manchester then attempted to mitigate 
its damages by entering into a one-year "spot market" contract with a third 
party.208 The trial court instructed the jury that it was to determine the seller's 
damages based on the difference between the market price at the time and place 
Peoples Gas would have taken delivery of the gas and the agreed price. 
202. According to U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b), the seller may recover the full contract price if it "is 
unable after reasonable effort to resell [the goods] at a reasonable price or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort would be unavailing." 
203. 697 F. Supp. at 167, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1060. 
204. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered 
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed .... "). 
205. The seller would lose the difference between the amount of interest computed on the full 
contract price and the amount computed on the contract price/resale price differential for the period 
during which it was unable to effectuate a reasonable resale. 
206. 862 F.2d 1439, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1000 (10th Cir. 1989). 
207. One such provision was the so-called "market-down" or "market-out" provision which 
permits the buyer to reduce the price for gas taken in order to remain competitive in the gas market. 
208. A spot market contract has a term from one month to one year, and provides the seller with 
a lower price than it would get under a long-term contract. 
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The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's reliance on the 
Official Comment to U.C.C. section 2-723 to justify a departure from its 
mandate was misplaced.209 Market price should be determined at the time 
Manchester learned of the repudiation. 210 Still to be decided was the controlling 
market. At trial, the parties seemed to assume that damages should be decided 
by reference to the spot market price under a spot market contract. Not so said 
the Tenth Circuit. The comparison should be with the higher market price of 
gas under a similar long-term contract.211 One wonders whether the decision 
would have been the same if the higher price was obtainable by a dissimilar spot 
market sale. 
Statutes of Limitations 
This year, the courts continued to misinterpret and misapply the "future 
performance" warranty provision of U.C.C. section 2-725(2).212 Lining up 
behind the other jurisdictions, the Alabama Supreme Court, in a case of first 
impression, held that a repair and replacement new car warranty does not 
explicitly extend to the future performance of the car. 
In Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile BMC Truck, lnc., 213 the plaintiff had 
purchased an Oldsmobile covered by General Motor's 12 month/12,000 mile 
"1981 New Car Warranty."214 The warranty provided that the dealer, Steel 
City, would repair and adjust defects within the agreed-upon period. The car 
turned out to have numerous defects which were never successfully repaired. 
209. The Comment instructs that "[t]his section is not intended to exclude the use of any other 
reasonable method of determining market price or of measuring damages if the circumstances of the 
case make this necessary." Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-723 Official Comment. The district court 
pointed to the uniqueness of gas purchase agreements and the volatility of the gas market as reasons 
for allowing the jury to speculate on future market conditions. 
210. In the court's opinion, the rule of U.C.C. § 2-723 has "the virtue of certainty." 862 F.2d at 
1447, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1012. 
211. The only rationale given was that long-term contracts are more predictable. The court 
summarily rejected the contrary position taken by at least one scholar who argues that the 
controlling comparison price should be the spot price. Id. at 1448 n.12. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1013 n.12 (citing Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element 
of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperfor-
mance, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1978)). 
212. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) provides: 
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of 
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except 
that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of 
the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the 
breach is or should have been discovered. 
213. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 701 (Ala. 1989). 
214. Tittle also purchased additional protection from his lender, General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation ("GMAC"), in the form of a supplemental warranty for 36 months or 36,000 miles. 
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Eventually, Tittle sued for breach of warranty,215 and the trial court granted the 
defendants' motion for a summary judgment216 based upon the statute of 
limitations defense. The Alabama Supreme Court framed the U.C.C. section 
2-725(2) issues on appeal as: did the repair warranty explicitly extend to the 
car's future performance?; and, if not, did a breach of the repair warranty occur 
upon tender of the car or upon failure to subsequently repair the defects? 
After reviewing the case law from other jurisdictions, the court adopted the 
majority view that such warranties do not guarantee the future performance of 
the car.217 If anything, they imply "that the goods may fall into disrepair or 
otherwise malfunction. No warranty that the goods will not, is to be inferred 
from the warranty to make needed repairs."218 Since the warranty did not 
extend to the car's future performance, that exception to the time of tender rule 
was inapplicable. As to the issue of whether the statute began to run upon 
tender or when the promise to repair was breached, the court found the answer 
in the subsection's "plain meaning."219 The repair or replace clause is a 
warranty, but it does not explicitly extend to the future performance of the good. 
Therefore, it must run from the time of tender. 
In Crouch v. General Electric Co.,220 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi, applying Mississippi law, held that neither of 
the two express warranties covering a helicopter engine explicitly extended to 
future peformance. Again, since the statute of limitations began to run upon 
tender of the helicopters, the plaintiff's six-year-old personal injury claim was 
time-barred. The Crouch court relied upon many of the same cases cited in 
Tittle to reach the same conclusion that a "maximum term of liability of 
215. The defendants were Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., General Motors Corpora-
tion ("GM"), and GMAC. Query whether U.C.C. § 2-725 is even applicable where the warranty 
is given by someone other than the seller? 
216. Only Steel City and GM filed motions; Tittle's case remained pending against GMAC. 
217. See, e.g., Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1222 (D. Del. 1983); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371, 18 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (1976); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 354 
N.Y.S.2d 778, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 
866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 699 (1975); Carabello v. Crown 
Controls Corp., 659 F. Supp. 839, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 101 (D. Colo. 1987); New 
England Power Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 20 Mass. App. 25, 477 N.E.2d 1054, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1735 (1985). 
But see Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawsen Co., 587 F.2d 813, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 65 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (repair or replace warranty 
which extends a specific period of time explicitly warrants future performance so that the cause of 
action accrues when the buyer discovered or should have discovered the defect within the warranty 
period). 
218. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 709. 
219. Id. at 712. 
220. 699 F. Supp. 585, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1113 (S.D. Miss. 1988). 
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warranty" provision221 is a repair and replace warranty, and the maximum term 
simply indicates the time the buyer has to exercise his remedy.222 
The Tittle and Crouch courts (as have others) failed to realize that the 
promise to repair or replace, if it is any one thing, is actually a remedy, not a 
warranty.223 Yet it makes no sense to speak of a remedy without a breach.224 
Perhaps the obligation is simply another way of saying the goods will function 
properly for the term of the repair or replace warranty. In other words, 
underlying the remedy is a warranty of future performance.225 
The holding of Tittle on when the statute of limitations begins to run is 
contrary to common sense. Imagine an optimistic car buyer with a 5 year/ 
60,000 mile warranty. If the statute begins to run from the time of tender, the 
buyer cannot sue on the contract even though he still has one year of protection 
remaining. There is no compelling policy reason for this result. 
In Hanscome v. Perry,226 the appellant, an interior decorator, sued the 
manufacturer and wholesaler for negligence after a damaged console was 
delivered to her customer. The action was dismissed by the trial court as time-
barred by the three-year tort statute of limitations. She filed a second suit for 
breach of contract, and express and implied warranties. That too was dismissed; 
by then four years had passed since the delivery of the console. 
221. The warranty in Crouch read as follows: "The warranty on each of the ... 170 ... engines 
shall cease three (3) years from the date the Government accepts the first engine .... " In the event of 
a defect, GE is only required to repair or replace the part. Id. at 593-94, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1121. 
222. The plaintiff's implied warranty claim was dismissed in a footnote; an implied warranty 
obviously cannot explicitly refer to future performance of the good. Id. at 593 n.8, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1121 n.8. 
Courts and commentators agree that implied warranties cannot explicitly extend to the future 
performance of the good as a matter of law. However, under pre-Code law prospective, implied 
warranties could extend to the future performance of the goods. The statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until there was knowledge of the breach. Comment, The Sales Statute of limitations in 
the Uniform Commercial Code-Does it Preclude Prospective Implied Warranties? 37 Fordham L. 
Rev. 247, 250 (1968). 
223. Under U.C.C. § 2-313(1 )(a), "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise." The promise to repair or 
replace relates to the seller's undertaking, not to the condition of the goods. 
224. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered 
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed .... ")(emphasis added). 
225. According to White and Summers, "many courts would interpret this [discussing a typical 
new car warranty J as a warranty that explicitly extends to future performance and would therefore 
grant four years from the time of the occurrence of the defect." 1 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code, 553 (3d ed. 1988). Yet in an earlier discussion it is suggested such warranties do 
not explicitly extend to the future since "all warranties in a sense apply to the future performance of 
goods." Id. at 551. The exception would swallow the rule. 
226. 75 Md. App. 605, 542 A.2d 421, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) (1988). 
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On appeal, the decorator relied on the earlier tort filing to invoke the tolling 
provision of U.C.C. section 2-725(3).227 The Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal. In order to meet the exception, the first action must 
have been "for the same breach," that is, another contract claim. By its own 
terms, the section can only apply to actions for breach of contract or warranty. 
U.C.C. section 2-725 has no bearing on tort and other unrelated claims. 
Two final cases bear witness to the fact that not all exceptions are easily 
found within the four corners of the statute. The North Carolina Court of 
Appeals held that U.C.C. section 2-725 does not apply to arbitration proceed-
ings.228 The court relied on the definition of "action"229 to find that it covers only 
judicial proceedings, and distinguished arbitration as an out-of-court proceed-
ing.230 Lastly, the Seventh Circuit held that a five-year-old counterclaim was not 
barred by U.C.C. section 2-725(1), given that a specific statutory exception to 
that provision existed under Illinois law.231 
ARTICLE SEVEN (DOCUMENTS OF TITLE) 
U.C.C. section 7-209(1) gives the warehouseman a lien on bailed goods 
"covered by a warehouse receipt." Section 7-202(2) lists the terms that must 
appear in a warehouse receipt. Suppose a warehouseman issues a receipt that 
does not contain all of the required terms. Does that mean that the warehouse-
man has no lien on the bailed goods under section 7-209? Under these 
circumstances the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division upheld the 
warehouseman's lien in Evergreen International Services Corp. v. Wallant 
International Trade, /nc. 232 In that case, the bailor entered into an arrangement 
with the warehouseman under which inventory was stored in the warehouse, 
removed from time to time, and replaced with additional inventory. The 
warehouseman issued invoices for each delivery to the warehouse. Eventually, 
the bailor refused to pay storage charges claiming that some of its inventory was 
missing from the warehouse. In the ensuing litigation, the bailor argued that the 
227. U.C.C. § 2-725(3) provides: "[W]here an action commenced within the time limited by 
subsection ( 1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach 
such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months 
after the termination of the first action .... " 
228. Cameron v. Griffith, 90 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 486 (1988). This holding may be dicta since the majority opines that an arbitrator's 
decision is not reviewable by a court of law. Id. at 165, 370 S.E.2d at 705, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 487. 
229. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) and U.C.C. § 1-201(1). 
230. Query whether this result is correct when U.C.C. § 1-201(1) includes "any other proceed-
ings in which rights are determined"? 
231. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 399 (7th Cir. 1988). 
The Illinois Statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-207 (1987) provided that the defendant's 
counterclaim was not time-barred as long as the plaintiff's claim arose before the cause of action 
brought as counterclaim was barred. 
232. 288 N.J. Super. 477, 550 A.2d 175, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1603 (1988). 
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warehouseman did not have a lien on the goods remaining in the warehouse 
because the invoices did not contain all of the terms required to be in a 
warehouse receipt. The trial court held that the warehouseman had a lien. On 
appeal, the court affirmed. It held that the invoices need only identify the bailor 
and warehouseman, and describe the goods and their location,233 which these 
invoices did. The sanction for omitting required terms was only that specified in 
subsection 7-202(2): liability "for damages caused by the omission to a person 
injured thereby." 
Under article 7, the duty of care owed by carriers and warehousemen toward 
goods in their possession is essentially the same: they must exercise the same 
degree of care as a reasonably careful man would exercise under like circum-
stances. 234 However, article 7 does not displace any state law rule that imposes a 
higher duty of care. 235 Some states hold either carrier or warehouseman or both 
to higher standards of care. 236 Consequently, it is possible that in a given state 
the standards of care for carriers and warehousemen will not be the same. This 
circumstance creates a problem where a bailee of goods is transporting and 
storing the goods at different times. If the goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged 
while in its possession, is the bailee liable as a carrier or as a warehouseman? 
The Nebraska Supreme Court discussed this issue in Fisher Corp. v. Consoli-
dated Freightways, /nc. 237 Under Nebraska law, a carrier is liable for any losses 
to the goods with certain exceptions not applicable in this case. A warehouse-
man, however, is liable only for losses caused by his negligence. In this case, 
Consolidated Freightways ("Consolidated") received a quantity of VCRs for 
interstate shipment to the buyer. Upon arrival, the buyer rejected the goods 
because they duplicated earlier deliveries. Consolidated returned the goods to its 
terminal for storage until it received instructions from the seller. Some time 
later, the seller requested that the goods be shipped back to it. During the time 
the goods were stored at Consolidated's terminal, unknown persons stole some 
of the goods. It could not be ascertained whether the theft had occurred before or 
after Consolidated received the seller's instructions to reship. The trial court left 
it to the jury to decide whether Consolidated was liable as a carrier or 
233. This holding was based upon a New Jersey case decided under the Uniform Warehouse 
Receipts Act, which was superceded by U.C.C. Article 7. See N.J. Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. 
Rector, 75 A 931, 76 N.J. Eq. 587 (1910). 
234. U.C.C. § 7-204(1) (warehouseman's duty of care); U.C.C. § 7-309(1) (carrier's duty of 
care). 
235. U.C.C. § 7-204(4) and Official Comment; U.C.C. § 7-309(1) and Official Comment. 
236. In many states, the carrier is an insurer of the safety of the goods except for acts of God or 
public enemies, fault of the shipper, inherent defect, or causes excepted by contract. R. Riegert & 
R. Braucher, Documents of Title 39 (3d ed. 1978). These state rules apply to intrastate shipments 
of goods. 1 S. Sorkin, Goods in Transit§ 1 .24[1] (1988). Additionally, federal legislation modifies 
some aspects of the carriers' liability. See generally 10 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts§ 1083 (3d ed. 1967); Sorkin, supra. 
Several states also impose higher standards of care on warehousemen. See Riegert & Braucher, 
supra note 236 at 30 and n.22. 
237. 230 Neb. 832, 434 N.W.2d 17, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 148 (1989). Prof. 
Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le contributed to the discussion of this case. 
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warehouseman, and the jury returned a verdict for Consolidated. On appeal the 
court affirmed, finding no error. In the course of its opinion, the court discussed 
whether Consolidated was liable as a carrier or a warehouseman. Citing cases 
from other jurisdictions, the court ruled that once the consignee of goods (here, 
the buyer) refused to accept a tender of delivery by the carrier, the carrier ceases 
to be a carrier and becomes a warehouseman. Thus when the buyer rejected the 
goods, Consolidated became a warehouseman and was liable only for losses 
attributable to its own negligence. The court then ruled that when the carrier-
turned-warehouseman accepts instructions from the bailor (here, the seller) to 
ship the goods to the specified location, he again becomes a carrier. 
ARTICLE SIX (BULK SALES) 
For the most part, the article 6 cases decided during the survey period 
grappled with issues that are familiar to bulk sales aficionados. The provision 
that spawned the most reported cases during this survey period is section 
6-103(3), which excepts from article 6 "(t]ransfers in settlement or realization 
of a lien or other security interest." This exception is no stranger to the 
appellate courts, having given rise to a number of different interpretations.238 
Aligning itself with several other courts that have considered the issue, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that section 6-103(3) exempts from article 6 
the transfer of collateral encumbered by a perfected security interest when all 
the consideration paid by the transfer goes to satisfy the secured debt, regardless 
of whether the collateral is transferred to a person other than the secured 
party.239 Inasmuch as the secured party's priority over the unsecured creditors 
would have entitled the secured party to reach the entire proceeds of an article 9 
foreclosure sale, the unsecured creditors also are not entitled to share in the 
proceeds when the collateral is liquidated at a bulk sale. 
Affording similar deference to article 9 security interests, a recent Oklahoma 
opinion applied section 6-103(3) to a noncomplying bulk transfer of collateral 
when the proceeds exceeded the size of the secured indebtedness.240 The defen-
dant bought the collateral (inventory of an auto parts store) for $55,000, of 
which $51,027. 90 was paid to the secured party in full satisfaction of the 
secured debt. Interpreting section 6-103(3) to exclude a bulk sale "only if 
settlement of a security interest is the purpose of the transfer,"241 the court held 
that payment of the secured debt was "merely an incident of the sale of the parts 
store assets to defendant"242 and therefore that the bulk transfer was not within 
238. For a synopsis of the various constructions that courts have given to§ 6-103(3), see Harris, 
Practicing Under Existing Bulk Sales Law-And a Look at the Future of Article 6, 22 U.C.C. L.J. 
195, 204 (1990). 
239. River City Prods., Inc. v. AEJ, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 452, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1600, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1319 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). 
240. Mid-America Indus., Inc. v. Ketchie, 767 P.2d 416, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1174 (Okla. 1989). 
241. 767 P.2d at 418, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1176. 
242. Id. at 419, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1177. 
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the exception of section 6-103(3). As a consequence of his failure to comply with 
article 6, the noncomplying buyer-defendant became personally liable for the 
value of the property transferred or the amount paid therefore. 243 Although that 
amount was $55,000, the court reduced the buyer's liability by the amount paid 
to the secured party. Its reasoning was similar to that of the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals: article 6 neither impairs a valid article 9 security interest nor affects 
article 9 remedies. 244 Accordingly, the hold of a perfected security interest in the 
transferred property is entitled to recover the proceeds of the sale. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently addressed yet another 
variation of this theme. 245 Kizer granted a security interest in existing and after-
acquired inventory to Malone & Hyde, Inc. ("M&H"). Among the debts 
secured by the collateral was Kizer's obligation to pay for inventory he bought 
from M&H. Following his default, Kizer signed a Notice of Default and 
Transfer of Possession Agreement, pursuant to which Kizer transferred to 
M & H certain property, including the collateral, in return for a release of his 
liability to M&H. Adopting the view that the exception in section 6-103(3) 
applied only when the entire consideration is used to satisfy the secured debt, 
the court held that section 6-103( 3) excluded the transfer at issue from article 6. 
In so holding, the court acknowledged that "an unsecured creditor of the 
transferor is not prejudiced by a transfer of assets that satisfies the security 
interest of a transferee who already has priority over the unsecured creditor."246 
Revised article 6, which has been approved for enactment by the American 
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, clarifies the applicability of article 6 to sales of collateral.247 It specifically 
provides that revised article 6 does not apply to (a) a transfer of collateral to a 
243. Article 6 provides that a noncomplying bulk transfer is "ineffective" against the creditors of 
the transferor. U.C.C. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105. In the view of some courts, the only remedies available to 
aggrieved creditors are those that enable the creditors to reach the transferred goods. Other courts 
permit the imposition of personal liability on the noncomplying transferee in bulk. See generally 
Harris, supra note 1, at 216-17. The opinion under discussion relies on Darby v. Ewing's Home 
Furnishings, 278 F. Supp. 917, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 198 (W.D. Okla. 1967), which 
relied upon Oklahoma's enactment of optional § 6-106 as a ground for imposing personal liability 
on the noncomplying buyer. 
244. See Mid-American Indus., 767 P.2d at 420, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1179; 
River City Prods, 774 S.W.2d at 453, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1322. For an exhaustive 
discussion of the effect of article 6 on article 9 security interests, see Harris, The Interaction of 
Articles 6 and 9 of The Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 179 ( 1986 ). 
245. Peerless Packing, Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 161, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 196 (W. Va. 1988). 
246. 376 S.E.2d at 165, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 201. In addition, the court 
treated the transaction as a retenti~n of collateral by the secured party pursuant to § 9-505, 
notwithstanding that the Transfer of Possession Agreement authorized the secured party to sell the 
collateral at a private sale after a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the directed verdict 
entered in favor of the secured party on the creditor's claim of unjust enrichment. 
247. Revised article 6 (cited herein as "revised U.C.C. § ") was promulgated for those states 
that are reluctant to follow the sponsors' primary recommendation that article 6 be repealed and 
bulk sales left unregulated. Highlights of the revised article are summarized in Frisch & Wladis, 
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 44 Bus. Law. 1445, 1496-97 
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secured party pursuant to section 9-503;248 (b) a sale of collateral pursuant to 
section 9-504;249 (c) retention of collateral pursuant to section 9-505;250 and, (d) 
a sale of an asset encumbered by a security interest if (i) all the proceeds of the 
sale are applied to the secured debt or (ii) the security interest is enforceable 
against the asset after it has been sold to the buyer and the net contract price is 
zero. 251 Additionally, the revised article excludes a sale of assets having a value, 
net of liens and security interests, of less than $10,000. 252 This exception would 
have excluded the transaction in the Oklahoma case altogether, on the theory 
that the recovery to creditors from relatively small sales is unlikely to justify the 
costs of compliance with the article. 253 
A final case worthy of note is the second appeal in Stone's Pharmacy, Inc. v. 
Pharmacy Accounting Management, lnc.254 That case revolved around a typical 
fact pattern: the transferor in bulk had filed for bankruptcy.255 Applying Texas 
law, the Eighth Circuit held that the bankrupt transferor was not a necessary 
party to an aggrieved creditor's action against a noncomplying bulk buyer and 
that the automatic stay did not affect the creditor's right to seek to assemble all 
the transferred assets for proper distribution. Although the transferor's bank-
ruptcy trustee might have enjoyed the right to avoid the bulk transfer under the 
Bankruptcy Code,256 the court observed that the transferor's bankruptcy trustee 
appears not to have pursued the bulk transfer claim in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing or otherwise. Had the trustee done so, the aggrieved creditor probably 
would have been precluded from asserting its claim against the noncomplying 
transferee. Nothing in revised article 6 would change the result in Stone's 
Pharmacy. 
( 1989). For a more detailed discussion, see Harris, supra note 1, passim. Utah has enacted revised 
article 6. 
248. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(b). 
249. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(c). 
250. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(d). This would have excluded the transaction in West Virginia 
case. 
251. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(e)(i) & (ii). Subsection (i) would have excluded the transaction 
in Kentucky case. Subsection (ii) excludes sales in which the only consideration passing to the seller 
is the assumption of the secured debt. 
252. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(1)(i). 
253. See revised Uniform Commercial Code§ 6-103 Official Comment 7. 
254. 875 F.2d 665, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1179 (8th Cir. 1989). The prior appeal 
appears at 812 F.2d 1063, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 206 (8th Cir. 1987). 
255. For example, this was the case in Peerless Packing, Inc. v. Malone and Hyde Inc., 376 
S.E.2d 161, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 196 (W. Va. 1988). 
256. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988). Section 6-107(8) of revised article 6 attempts to preclude a 
bankruptcy trustee from attacking a noncomplying bulk sale. It provides in part that "(a] buyer's 
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6-104(1) does not ... (ii) render the sale 
ineffective, void, or voidable ... " 
